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PENSION SIMPLIFICATION
DAVID A. PRATT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Complaints about the complexity of the federal pension laws are
not a recent phenomenon.' Almost 60 years ago, following the
changes enacted by the Revenue Act of 1942, one commentator wrote
that the result of legislation was "provisions so complicated that they
are difficult to read and in some respects so vague that they may be
hard to apply."2 At that time, there were only four basic plan
qualification requirements set out in the Internal Revenue Code
("IRC").
The current rules are largely the product of the Employee
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School; of counsel (an independent contractor)
to Hodgson Russ LLP, Albany, New York; and to Downs, Rachlin & Martin PLLC,
Burlington, Vermont. My thoughts relating to pension simplification were greatly
helped by discussions with members of the Executive Committee and the Employee
Benefits Committee of the Section of Taxation of the New York State Bar
Association (NYSBA), with particular thanks to Andrew Stumpff. The views
expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of NYSBA or any of
its members or committees. This article is dedicated to my friend Ed. Harville, who
died while it was being written.
1. For examples of interesting discussions of pension complexity and the need
for simplification see Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of the Overall State of
the Federal Tax System and Recommendations for Simplification, JCS-3-01, Apr.
2001; New York State Bar Association, Special Committee on Pension
Simplification,A ProcessAwry: Federal PensionLaws, 43 TAX NOTES 463 (1989);
Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of Present Law Tax Rules Relating to
Qualified PensionPlans (JCX-30-98), May 4, 1998, reprinted in TAX NOTES

TODAY, May 5, 1998, and in 25 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 1135 (1998); New
York State Bar Association, Special Committee on Pension Simplification, ERISA:
A Process Still Awry, A Need to Simplify, 83 TAX NOTES 1053 (1999); Gene
Steuerle, Why Pension Simplification Is So Difficult To Achieve, 80 TAX NOTES 253
(1998); Warshawsky, Minimum Distribution Requirements: Reform or Remove

Them, TAX NOTES, Sept. 30, 1998, p. 1133; Joint Committee on Taxation Staff,
Overview of Present Law and Issues Relating to Employer-Sponsored Retirement
Plans for Ways and Means Oversight Hearing, March 23, 1999, reprinted at 55

DTR (BNA) L-5 (Mar. 23, 1999); David A. Pratt & Diane Bennett, Simplifying
Retirement PlanDistributions, N.Y.U. 57TH INSTITUTE ON FED. TAX'N EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, ch. 5 (1999); David J. Kautter, Employee
Benefits: Statutory Simplification, 18 TAX MGMT. COMP. PLAN. J. 51 (Mar. 2,

1990); Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans ("APPWP"), Gridlock:
Pension Law in Crisis and the Road to Simplification (Sept. 1989), reprinted in

TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 20, 1989, 89 TNT 213-24 available at
http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6 2002) (recommending 29 specific
simplifications of the law). The 1989 New York State Bar Association Committee
report listed, as Appendix A, those areas of current law most in need of
simplification See 43 TAX NOTES 463, at 476-77 (1989).
2. John W. Drye, Jr., Pension and Other Deferred Compensation Plans under
Section 162 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 2 N. Y. U. INST. FED. TAX'N 48, 50 (1943).
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),3 a statute that
made many worthwhile changes, but was enacted in response to the
very different economic and social conditions of the mid 1960s.
Subsequent legislation has rarely represented good pension policy:
generally, it has been revenue-driven or inspired by a desire to thwart
the selfish machinations of highly compensated business owners and
executives.4
As Pamela Perun and Eugene Steuerle have pointed out,
ERISA at 25 is no longer a sensible or practical statute. And the
pension system it governs is an uncoordinated jumble of plans and a
labyrinth of rules and regulations, sometimes exhibiting neither rhyme
nor reason.... Prior to ERISA, IRC section 401(a), the major tax statute
for pension plans, ended with section 401(a)(10). In 1999, it ended with
IRC section 401(a)(34). This averages out to one fundamental legal
requirement added for each year since ERISA was enacted. 5

This complexity has been acknowledged recently by the Joint
Committee on Taxation ("JCT") that has noted that the federal
pension laws "are recognized as among the most complex set of rules
applicable to any area of the tax law,"6 and that
[tlhe number of different tax-favored retirement arrangements increase
complexity in the pension rules because different rules are needed for
each type of arrangement. A great deal of simplicity could be achieved,
for example, if employers were permitted to choose from only one or two
model pension plans. However, this would also greatly reduce the
flexibility provided employers and employees under present law.7

3. PUB.L. NO. 93-406 (codified as amended in various sections of Titles 26 and
29 of the U.S. Code).
4. Governmental and church plans, as defined in 29 U.S.C. §1002(32)-(33), and
26 U.S.C. § 414(d-e), are exempt from many of the normal requirements of ERISA
and the Code. Similarly, multi-employer plans, which by definition result from
collective bargaining, are subject to different rules. The different rules that apply to
governmental, church and multi-employer plans are beyond the scope of this
article.
5. PAMELA PERUN & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, ERISA at 50, in ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY MATERIALS, PENSION POLICY CONFERENCE, ERISA AFTER 25 YEARS
(Course No. SE40, September-October 1999).

6. Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of Present-Law Rules Relating to
Qualified Pension Plans (JCX-30-98), May 4, 1998, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY,
98 TNT 86-21, May 5, 1998, availableat www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6 2002).
7. Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of Present Law and Issues Relating
to Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans, 55 DTR L-5, reprinted in THE DAILY TAX
REPORT (BNA), March 23, 1999. This point is echoed by Gone Steuerle:
Do we need both traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs, both profit-sharing and
employee stock option plans, both money purchase and profit-sharing plans,
both 401(k) and 403(b) plans? My feeling is that the gains from these
differentiations are small, if any, and the costs of administration are almost
inevitably higher than any gains.

Gene Steuerle, Why Pension Simplification is So Difficult to Achieve, 80 TAX NOTES
253 (1998).
The JCT report also suggests that the following factors should be considered in
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Why is simplification a worthwhile goal? First, and most
importantly, the complexity of the rules discourages employers particularly small employers - from adopting plans. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics found that, in 1999, 56% of full-time employees were
covered by retirement plans, while only 21% of part-time employees
were covered." Eighty-one percent of workers in establishments with
2,500 or more employees were covered, but only 30% of those in
establishments with fewer than 50 employees were covered.9 In
recent years, Congress has attempted to encourage small employers to
adopt plans, but many small employers are totally unaware of these
changes. According to The 2002 Small Employer Retirement Survey
("SERS"), involving employers with fewer than 100 employees, few
were familiar with the important pension changes enacted by the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
("EGTRRA"):
'Sixty-eight percent of sponsors and 86 percent of non-sponsors
(companies not sponsoring a plan) say they are not familiar with this
law, which has important provisions for employment-based retirement
plans.... The 2002 SERS finds that 87 percent of small-employer nonsponsors were unaware that the new tax law allows them to take a tax
credit of up to 50 percent for the start-up costs of establishing and
administering a new retirement plan,' said Dallas Salisbury, president
and CEO of EBRI. 'When told of the new tax credit, 68 percent of nonsponsors said it would make it more attractive for them to offer a
retirement plan." 10
relation to any simplification proposal:'
(1) [Ihe extent to which the proposed change is consistent with the
underlying policy objective of the rule that is altered; (2) whether a
complete revision of rules that employers and plan administrators
understand and use should be made solely in the interest of
simplification; (3) whether additional legislation with respect to a rule
that has already been subject to significant legislation itself creates
complexity; (4) the extent to which transition rules and grandfather
rules contribute to complexity; and (5) whether any attempt to simplify
the rules relating to employer-provided pension plans should be
required to be revenue neutral with respect to present law.
8. U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE
INDUSTRY, 1999 (Dec. 19, 2001), Tbl.1.

9. Id. Similarly, a recent General Accounting Office study found that the
percentage of firms sponsoring a retirement plan was only 12.9% for those with
fewer than 10 employees, 28.6% for those with 10-24, and 39.7% for those with 2549. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Private Pensions: Improving Worker Coverage

and Benefits, GAO-02-225 (Apr. 2002), (citing the Employee Benefit Research
Institute); see also Patrick J. Purcell, Pension Sponsorship and Participation:
Summary of Recent Trends, Washington, D.C., CONG. RES. SERVICE, 2001; Alicia H.
Munnell et al., How Important Are Private Pensions?
available at
http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/ csomlexecutive/crr/issues/ib_8.pdf (last visited July
12, 2002).
10. Employee Benefit Research Institute, Press Release, Most Small Businesses
Unaware of New Tax Law Incentives to Sponsor a Retirement Plan, Washington,
D.C., May 7, 2002, available at http://www.ebri.org/prrel/pr596.pdf (last visited
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The rules for traditional defined benefit pension plans are
especially complex, and this has undoubtedly been a major factor in
the recent shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
plans, such as 401(k) plans. In 1975, total defined benefit plan assets
were $186 billion, more than twice the total defined contribution plan
assets of $74 billion. In 1996, defined benefit plan assets had
increased to $1.6 trillion, while defined contribution plan assets had
increased to $1.5 trillion. 1
Over the same period, annual
contributions to defined benefit plans increased by 50%, from $24
billion to $36 billion, while contributions to defined contribution plans
increased by over 900%, from $13 billion to $134 billion. 12 According
to the Congressional Research Service:
In recent years, the personal savings rate - the percentage of personal
disposable income not devoted to current consumption - has declined
substantially.... [Tihe decline in the savings rate that has occurred
since the mid-1990s is unprecedented in the post World War II era in
the United States. In 2000, the personal savings rate was negative for
the first time since 1933, during the Great Depression.
The savings rate has declined steadily from a high of 10.6% in
1975 to 9.2% in 1985, 5.6% in 1995, 2.2% in 1999 and -0.1% in 2000.1'
An estimated 67.6 million workers between the ages of 25 and 64
(62.6%
of workers) did not own a retirement savings account of any
14
kind.

At the same time, retirement income adequacy for most
Americans has suffered a downward trend, despite the exceptionally
healthy economy throughout the 1990s:
In 1998, every group of near-retirees except those at the very top lost
ground compared with their counterparts in 1983. The contraction of
traditional defined benefit pension plans and their replacement by
defined contribution plans appears to have helped rich, older Americans
Sept. 6, 2002).
11. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Pension Coverage and
Participation: Summary of Recent Trends, 2000 TNT 222-24, Nov. 6, 2000,
reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 16, 2000 (the "CRS Report"), available at
http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
12. Id.
13. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Retirement Savings
and Household Wealth in 1997: Analysis of Census Bureau Data, 2001 TNT 75-16,
Apr. 5, 2001, availableat http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
14. Id. (reflecting the CRS Analysis of the 1996 Panel of the Census Bureau's
Survey of Income and Program Participation). The mean and median values of all
retirement accounts in a household were as follows:
Mean
Median
Workers 25 to 34
20,259
8,000
Workers 35 to 44
41,582
20,000
Workers 45 to 54
57,845
28,000
Workers 55 to 64
72,347
36,668
Id. 77% of all workers 55 to 64 years old lived in households with retirement
savings of between zero and $37,000 in 1997. Id.
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but hurt a large group of lower-income Americans."'

Given the well-documented financial problems facing the Social
Security system as the baby boomers begin to retire, a strong private
pension system to supplement Social Security is now more important
than ever.
A second major reason supporting simplification is the cost of
complying with the current rules. An employer sponsoring, or
thinking of sponsoring, a plan needs to retain expert advice to help
the employer:
" to choose which type of plan best meets its needs;
" to decide between the many plan design alternatives in such areas as
eligibility of employees to participate, vesting of benefits, and the
contribution or benefit formula;
" to communicate the plan to employees; and
* to keep the plan in compliance with the constantly changing
requirements of the law and regulations.

Every dollar spent on these administrative expenses is a dollar
that could otherwise have been spent on improving the retirement
benefits actually payable to employees. A recent study found that a
1% annual differential in administrative expenses, over a 40-year
period, results in a 27% difference in assets available to an employee
at retirement age.16
The ultimate simplification would be to have no rules at all for
qualified retirement plans, but this would be patently absurd.
Accordingly, in recommending changes which would simplify the
operation of retirement plans, this author has considered (1) the need
to protect employee rights, (2) the need to ensure that meaningful
benefits are provided to rank and file employees and (3) the
importance of expanding coverage under the private pension system.
II. QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS: CHANGES DISCUSSED
BY THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION STUDY
In April 2001, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
issued a detailed study (the "JCT Study")17 of the federal tax system
15. Press Release, Middle Americans' Retirement Wealth Fell as Stock Market
Soared, New Study Reveals Boom a Retirement Bust for All but the Richest; Next
Retirees More Likely than Predecessors to Live in Poverty (May 2, 2002) (quoting
EDWARD N. WOLFF, Retirement Insecurity: The Income Shortfalls Awaiting the

Soon-to-Retire, Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C).
16. HAZEL BATEMAN & OLIVIA S. MITCHELL, New Evidence on Pension Plan
Design and Administrative Expenses, PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, Working Paper
PRC-2000-10 at 1 (Mar. 2002), available at http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/
prc/PRC/WP/WP2002-10.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
-17. Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of the Overall State of the Federal Tax
System and Recommendations for Simplification,JCS-3-01 (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter
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and recommendations for simplification. The JCT Study includes
numerous recommendations for simplification of the rules governing
qualified plans. This article will first address those issues that were
covered in the JCT Study.
A. Definition of Compensation
The IRC provides different definitions of compensation for
different qualified plan purposes. There are three main definitions
relevant to qualified plans:
1. Section 415 compensation, which is primarily used in applying the
section 415 limitations on contributions and benefits;
2. Section 404 compensation, used in calculating the deduction allowable
to the employer for its contributions to the plan under section 404; and
3. Section 414(s) compensation, used in testing whether the plan
satisfies the Code's nondiscrimination rules.
Each of these definitions is also used for other purposes and, in
each case, variations from the general definition are permitted.
According to the JCT Study, there are 5 permissible definitions of
section 415 compensation, 5 permissible definitions of section 404
compensation, and 22 permissible definitions of section 414(s)
compensation.' 8 There is also a special definition of compensation for
SIMPLE plans.1 9 The JCT Study recommends a single definition for
all qualified plan purposes, including determining plan benefits. The
uniform definition would be: (1) the amount reportable as
compensation on Form W-2, plus (2) elective contributions, including
section 125 salary reductions."0
If the plan year or the employer's taxable year is other than the
calendar year, then the compensation used would be compensation for
the calendar year ending within that plan year or taxable year. The
staff notes that it may be appropriate to allow imputed compensation
or compensation from a prior employer to be used under a defined
benefit plan in certain cases. 21 This change would be helpful; however,
an equal degree of simplification would be achieved, and additional
flexibility retained, if the uniform definition were used for all
discrimination testing purposes, but not for purposes of the benefit
formula.22
Reducing the number of alternative definitions of
"JCT Study"].
18. Id. at 172-73, Tbl. 13, (Definitions of Compensation for Qualified Retirement
Plan Purposes). All page references to the JCT Study are to Volume II,
Recommendations of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to Simplify the
Federal Tax System.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 408(p)(6)(A) (2000). SIMPLE plans are discussed in section II.E
below.
20. JCT Study, at 170.
21. Id.
22. This approach was suggested by the Association of Private Pension and
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compensation will reduce complexity in plan 'design and
administration. In addition, it is important to have uniformity in
applying statutory requirements such as the section 415 limitations
and the nondiscrimination rules. However, it is important to allow
employers flexibility in determining which definition of compensation
to use in determining benefits under a plan. Any potential abuse of
this flexibility should be avoided by the fact that the employer will
have to use the uniform definition in testing the plan under the
nondiscrimination rules.
B. Minimum Coverage and NondiscriminationRules for Qualified
Plans
The Treasury regulations implementing the coverage and
nondiscrimination rules are exceptionally complex, and often require
detailed computations.
They reflect a change to objective
mathematical tests from the facts and circumstances approach that
prevailed before enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 86").
A qualified plan must cover a minimum percentage of the employer's
non-highly compensated employees (NHCEs).23
The minimum
percentage is determined by reference to the percentage of highly
compensated employees (HCEs) who benefit under the plan. The plan
must satisfy one of two tests, the ratio percentage test or the average
benefits test.
In the context of retirement plans, nondiscrimination has a
specialized meaning, and is strictly a tax issue, which is not addressed
by ERISA. The basic nondiscrimination rule requires that either the
contributions to, or the benefits under, the plan not discriminate in
favor of HCEs. 4
In its simplest form, nondiscrimination in this context requires
that
1.

a defined benefit plan may not provide benefits for HCEs that are
higher, as a percentage of compensation, than the benefits provided
for NHCEs, and

2.

a defined contribution plan may not provide contributions for HCEs
that are higher, as a percentage of compensation, than the

Welfare Plans ("APPWP"), in Gridlock: Pension Law in Crisis and the Road to
Simplification(Sept., 1989), reprinted in TAX NOTES ToDAY, Oct. 20, 1989, 89 TNT

213-24, availableat http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
23. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(3), 410(b)(1) (2000). The term "highly compensated
employee" is defined in section 414(q). Essentially, a HCE is any person who (1)
earned at least $80,000 (indexed) from the employer during the preceding year
(and, if the employer so elects, was among the highest paid 20% of employees) or (2)
owned, directly or by attribution (for instance, from a family member), more than
5% of the employer at any time during the current or preceding year. Any plan
participant who is not a HCE is a non-highly compensated employee (NHCE).
24. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4) (2000). at n.23 (summarizing the definition of
"highly compensated employee"; 26 U.S.C. § 414(q) (2000)).
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contributions provided for NHCEs."

Even in its simplest form, this rule is not invulnerable to
challenge: should the tax system subsidize an annual benefit of
$120,000 for an employee making $150,000 per year if the plan
provides a benefit of only $16,000 for an employee making $20,000 per
year? The HCE presumably has other assets, and is in a better
position than the NHCE to save at least part of his or her disposable
income for retirement. Even accepting that, under a voluntary
pension system, there must be incentives for the decision-makers (who
are usually HCEs) to adopt a plan, should the plan not be required to
provide at least a minimum level of benefits for low-paid employees.
Under current law, the "nondiscrimination" rules permit benefits
for HCEs that can be significantly greater, in proportion to
compensation, than those provided for NHCEs.
First, the
nondiscrimination rules are linked to the employee coverage rules: a
plan will satisfy the nondiscrimination rules if it provides a
"nondiscriminatory" benefit to a group of employees that satisfies the
employee coverage rules of Code section 410(b). The practical effect of
this rule is that a plan can satisfy the nondiscrimination rules while
providing benefits to significantly less than all of the NHCEs.
Second, the plan's contributions or benefits can be "integrated" or
coordinated with Social Security, the effect of which is to increase the
contributions or benefits for the HCEs in relation to those for the
NHCEs. 6 Prior to the changes enacted by the Tax Reform Act these
rules could be defended, with some degree of plausibility, on the basis
that the overall level of benefits, under Social Security and the private
retirement plan, was relatively level.27 The "permitted disparity"
rules of current law are basically indefensible, and are extremely
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4) (2000). Under the rule, either the contributions or
the benefits (but not both) must be nondiscriminatory. This allows for cross testing,
under which benefits under a defined benefit plan are converted into equivalent
contributions or (more often) amounts allocated to employees under a defined
contribution plan are converted to equivalent benefits. Id.
26. 26 U.S.C. § 401(1) (2000) and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(1)-i through 1.401(1)-6
(2000).
27. Even under prior law, the conceptual basis for integration was shaky
at best.
Employers are paying a percentage of their workers' salaries into Social
Security. However, the payment is a tax, not a pension contribution. The
benefits for which the employer is contributing are not for its current
workers, but for workers now retired, from an earlier generation,
perhaps before this employer was even in business. To construe the
employer's contribution as something other than a general tax and the
employee's benefit as somehow purchased in part by the employee's
employer is carrying a useful political fiction to an illogical extreme.
Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination,
Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 435, 485 (1987); See
generally Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income And
The Problem of Integrating Private Pensions And Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1063 (1997).
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complex. 8
Accordingly, I recommend that the permitted disparity rules be
repealed in 29
their entirety. The JCT Study made 3 recommendations
in this area:
1.

Excludable

Employees

should

be

disregarded in

applying the minimum coverage and general nondiscrimination rules, even if some or all of them are
covered by the plan.
This proposal should be enacted. Enactment would further two
important goals: it would simplify plan administration, and would
encourage employers to reduce or eliminate eligibility waiting periods,
thus increasing plan coverage and the total benefits that the typical
employee (who will have several jobs during his or her working career)
will accumulate. One further change should also be made: the topheavy rules ° should be modified to clarify that, if excludable
employees are allowed to participate, the employer is not required to
provide the top-heavy minimum contribution or benefit until they
have satisfied the plan's normal eligibility requirements.

2.

The cross-testing rules should be codified, and the
purposes for which the cross-testing rules may be used
should be clarified.

With reference to this recommendation, the JCT Study noted
that:
[t]he 1986 legislative history could be read to suggest that cross-testing
should apply only in the case of combined plans or average benefits
testing. Moreover, to the extent that cross-testing appears to be used in
some cases merely to provide better benefits to highly compensated
employees, cross-testing could be considered not only complicated, but
also contrary to the policy behind the nondiscrimination requirements. 3
Cross-testing is made easier by the fact that a plan can be tested
on the basis of "rate groups" rather than on the basis of the entire
plan.32 Under this approach, provided that the group of employees
28. The rules for integrating defined benefit plans are extraordinarily complex.
See Treas. Reg. § 1. 401(l)-3 (2000). The root of the complexity is the difficulty in
determining the appropriate portion of the social security benefit attributable to
the contributions of the employer whose plan is to be integrated. JOHN H.
LANGBEIN

& BRUCE A.

WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, 3D ED. 320

(Foundation Press 2000). For a critique of the rationale underlying integration see
Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policy: Nondiscrimination,
Integration,and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 435 (1987).

29. JCT Study, at 182-83.
30. See generally, 26 U.S.C. § 416 (2000) (setting forth special rules for topheavy plans).
31. JCT Study, at 183.
32. A rate group exists for each HCE participating in the plan, and consists of
that HCE and all other participants (HCEs and NHCEs) whose allocation rate (if
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that receives each level of benefits under the plan satisfies a
liberalized version of the nondiscriminatory classification test, that
level of benefits is nondiscriminatory. 33 This technique is based upon,
and encouraged by, IRS regulations. 34
However, since the JCT study was published, new final crosstesting regulations have been issued.n Although cross testing is now
far more prevalent and is used far more aggressively than in the past,
the ability to cross test has long been available.36 Accordingly, I
suggest that a better approach would be for the Treasury Department
and the IRS: (1) to solicit comments and recommendations for
improvement to the current rules, together with information as to
their effect on the formation and administration of both large and
small plans; and (2) to consider whether to issue new proposed
regulations in the light of that information. Any revisions to the
regulations should include adequate time for plan sponsors to
transition from the old rules to the new rules without undue
disruption.
For an employer whose HCEs are, in general, older than its
NHCEs, cross testing allows the employer to replicate the
contribution pattern of a defined benefit plan (significantly higher
contributions, as a percentage of compensation, for the older HCEs
than for the younger NHCEs) without incurring the commitments
associated with maintaining a defined benefit plan. Accordingly, any
assessment of the effects of the cross-testing rules should attempt to
determine whether, and to what extent, (1) employers who might
otherwise have adopted defined benefit plans are using cross-tested
plans instead and (2) whether the NHCEs covered by those crosstested plans are in fact receiving benefits comparable to those which
the plan is being tested on the basis of contributions) or equivalent benefit accrual
rate (if the plan is being tested on the basis of benefits, as would be the case for a
cross-tested defined contribution plan) is equal to or greater than the HCE's rate.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(4)-2(c)(1), 1.401(a)(4)-3(c)(1) (2000).
33. The ratio percentage of the rate group (percentage of NHCEs in the group
divided by percentage of HCEs in the group) must equal or exceed the lesser of (i)
the ratio percentage of the plan or (ii) the midpoint between the safe and unsafe
harbor percentages applicable to the plan. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(4)-2(c)(3), -3(c)(2)
(2000). Thus, for instance, if 90% of the employees of the employer are NHCEs, the
safe harbor percentage is 27.5% and the unsafe harbor percentage is 20%, giving a
midpoint of 23.75%. Accordingly, if the rate group includes 100% of the HCEs, it
need only include 23.75% of the NHCEs. If the rate group includes only 50% of the
HCEs, it need only include 11.875% of the NHCEs. These relatively brief extracts
from the nondiscrimination regulations will, I hope, give the reader a sense of the
crazy world of nondiscrimination testing, where the hapless plan administrator
(Alice) tries to satisfy the mathematical cravings of the Treasury Department (the
Red Queen), while being uncomfortably aware of the sanction for failure ("Off with
her head!").
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8 (2000).
35. TD 8954, 66 Fed. Reg. 34535 (2001).
36. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-202, 1981-2 C.B. 93 (setting forth the pre- TRA 86
rules for determining plan comparability).
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they would receive under a defined benefit plan.
3.

The ratio percentage test should be modified to allow
more plans to use it.

Finally, the JCT Study recommended that, in applying the ratio
percentage test, the ratio percentage would be reduced below 70% if (i)
the plan covers a reasonable classification of employees, under present
law rules, and (ii) the non-highly compensated employee (NHCE)
concentration percentage is at least 60%. The ratio percentage would
be reduced to 65% if the NHCE concentration percentage is 60% to
79%, and to 60% if the NHCE concentration percentage is 80% or
more.
This change should not be made. First, it is not clear why the
NHCE concentration percentage has any bearing on the appropriate
percentage to be used in the ratio percentage test. Second, there is a
strong argument that the current 70% threshold - though sanctioned
by long usage - is too low. Why should an employer be able to exclude
at least 30% of its non-excludable employees, as well as all of its
excludable employees, for any reason it chooses?
In the author's opinion, the current rules permit far too many
employees to be excluded completely from participation and allow
benefits for HCEs that are far too generous when compared to the
benefits provided for NHCEs. Accordingly, although any progress
must most likely be incremental, and political realities may prevent
attainment of the goal, this article supports the position taken by
Daniel Halperin and Alicia Munnell:
The centerpiece of improving coverage for the rank and file requires
jettisoning the complicated Treasury regulations regarding participation
of the highly compensated versus that for the non-highly compensated
and replacing it with the requirement that a qualified pension plan
must cover all employees (in a given line of business). Under this
requirement, no one earning less than any participant could be excluded
because of the nature of his job. The only exception would be employees
earning less than $20,000 (indexed for annual wage), who would be
covered under the public USA-type plan. Unlike current law, the new
provisions would not tolerate any disparity between the benefits for the
higher and lower paid. No longer would it be acceptable for the
participation from the highly compensated to be not "too much" greater
than the level of participation from the remainder of the work force, and
for the average benefit of the non-highly compensated to be 70% of that
for the highly compensated. Nondiscrimination would mean that the
same provisions cover all employees. If the plan failed this simple test,
none of the participants would be eligible for favorable tax treatment.
37. DANIEL I. HALPERIN & ALICIA H. MUNNELL, How the PensionSystem Should
Be Reformed, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CONFERENCE ON ERISA AFTER 25 YEARS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING PENSION REFORM

(Sept. 1999), available at

www.brook.edu/es/events/erisa/99papers/erisalO.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2002). I
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C. The NondiscriminationRegulations under Section 401(a)(4)3s

The regulations under Code section 401(a)(4) are very
complex, and deal with (1) nondiscrimination in the amount of
contributions or benefits, (2) the nondiscriminatory availability of
benefits, rights and features under the plan and (3)
nondiscrimination in special situations, such as plan amendments.
The regulations have been widely, and correctly, criticized for
their complexity. It is not clear why it was thought necessary or
appropriate to replace the prior facts-and-circumstances approach,
which had worked perfectly well for many years. The regulations
fail to achieve their avowed purpose of establishing bright line

rules because they are too complex.39 Furthermore, '[tihe complex
numerical test actually legalizes discrimination against rank-andfile workers to a greater extent than almost any benefits
professional would previously have deemed possible.'40

According

to the American Academy of Actuaries:
[tihe first and foremost option to encourage the creation of private
pension plans is to reduce the complexity of regulations.... Another
approach... is for Congress to provide plans that adopt certain
provisions with relief from particular costly or complex regulatory
requirements.... For example, in exchange for a plan offering shorter
vesting, partial indexing, or enhanced portability, Congress could permit
less costly methods of discrimination testing ....

Among existing

regulations, those that require elaborate tests to ensure that plans do
not discriminate in favor of more highly compensated workers are most

would modify the proposal in one respect: if the plan failed to satisfy the new test, I
would penalize only the HCEs (or some similar group). Rank and file employees
should not be penalized for plan design decisions over which they had no control.
38. A comprehensive discussion of the nondiscrimination rules would require a
separate article, so this paper only addresses the topic briefly. Numerous articles
discuss the desirability or otherwise of numerical nondiscrimination rules; see, e.g,
Bruce Wolk, DiscriminationRules for QualifiedRetirement Plans: Good Intentions
Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 428 (1984); Michael W. Melton,
Making the Nondiscrimination Rules of Tax-Qualified Retirement Plans More
Effective, 71 B.U. L. REV. 47, 67 (1991); see generally the following additional
references: Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan
Anti-DiscriminationProvisions Bearable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790 (1988); Joseph
Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-File
Compensation, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 597 (1994); Douglas W. Ell, Fallacies and
Structural Flaws of Complex Numerical NondiscriminationTesting, 58 TAX NOTES
1775 (March 29, 1993); Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies:

Nondiscrimination,Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV.
435 (1987).

39. "The present nondiscrimination and coverage rules provide enormous work
for actuaries and consultants, with little benefit to employees and employers."
Douglas Ell, Perspective- The "Perfect"Retirement Plan, 12 BENEFITS LAW JOURNAL
(no. 4) 45, 46 (Winter 1999).
40. Douglas W. Ell, Fallacies and Structural Flaws of Complex Numerical
Nondiscrimination Testing, TAX NOTES TODAY, April 5, 1993, 93 TNT 75-88,
availableat http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6 2002).
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in need of simplification. 4'
The JCT Study expressed the belief "that further simplification
could be achieved by eliminating some nondiscrimination rules or
making significant changes to the rules," but concluded that "such
changes would involve policy ramifications that are beyond the scope
of this study."4 ' This assessment is correct. The current rules are
repeatedly identified as being among the most complex rules in an
unusually complex area of the Code, and reduction of the level of
complexity might encourage more employers, particularly smaller
employers, to adopt qualified plans. 4'
However, any significant
changes to these rules cause additional complexity and disruption for
existing plan sponsors.
There is a strong argument that all of the current regulations
under Code section 401(a)(4), not only the cross-testing rules, should
be reviewed. Anecdotal evidence and personal experience suggest that
discrimination is in fact more widespread than it was before these
regulations were adopted."
However, changing such fundamental
rules again, so soon after IRS issued the new cross-testing
regulations, would be unduly disruptive. Accordingly, as suggested
above, a better approach would be for the Treasury Department and
the IRS to conduct a systematic review of the regulations, with public
input. Any revisions to the regulations should include adequate time
for plan sponsors to transition from the old rules to the new rules
without undue disruption.
D. Vesting
A participant's employer-provided benefit under a qualified plan
must vest at least as rapidly as is required by one of two alternative
vesting schedules:
1.

Five year cliff vesting: no vesting until the participant has five
years of service, then full vesting on completion of five years of
service.

41. Retirement Income Security, American Academy of Actuaries Public Policy
Monograph, 1998 No. 1.
42. JCT Study, at 183.
43. In 1989, the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans identified two
fundamental misconceptions in pension regulation: evil plan myopia ("regulators'
tendency to formulate general rules by (1) considering only those few plan sponsors
with abusive intent, and (2) failing to consider the effect of the regulation on the
vast majority of sponsors, who have no such intent.") and computer omnipotence.
APPWP, Gridlock: Pension Law in Crisis and the Road to Simplification, Sept. 1,
1989, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY Oct. 20, 1989, 89 TNT 213-24, available at
http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
44. Douglas W. Ell, Fallacies and Structural Flaws of Complex Numerical
Nondiscrimination Testing, TAX NOTES TODAY, April 5, 1993, 93 TNT 75-88,
available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
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Graduated vesting:' 20% after three years of service with an

additional 20% for each subsequent year of service, resulting in
100% vesting after seven years of service.45
If the plan is top-heavy, then it must provide either (1) 100%
vesting after three years of service or (2) graduated vesting, beginning
at 20% after two years of service with 20% per year thereafter,
46
resulting in 100% vesting after six years of service.
Certain years of service may be disregarded for vesting purposes,
including service performed before the adoption of the plan. 4' The
JCT Study recommends that the vesting requirements for all qualified
plans be made uniform, by applying the top-heavy vesting schedules
to all plans.4 EGTRRA has already enacted this change for employer
matching contributions, effective generally for contributions for plan
years beginning after 2001, 49 so the recommendation would essentially
affect employer non-matching contributions to both defined benefit
and defined contribution plans.
The author supports this proposal. In addition, the author
suggests that it is time to reconsider the rule allowing the plan to
disregard pre-plan service. An employee who has worked for the
employer for several years before a plan is adopted has already
suffered through accruing no benefits during that period. To allow
pre-plan service to be disregarded is unfair.
It is now more widely understood than it was when ERISA was
enacted that generous vesting has only a modest effect on the total
cost of a retirement plan. Many plans, particularly 401(k) plans,
already provide faster vesting than the law requires.
Survey evidence indicates that the median job tenure in the
American economy in 2000 was about 31/2 years, which is less than the
number of years of service needed for full vesting under 3 of the 4
minimum vesting schedules (5 year cliff, 3 to 7 year graded and 2 to 6
year top heavy graded).50 About 25% of all workers had been with
their current employer for 12 months or less."' From this perspective,
and in view of the fact that many plans already satisfy the top-heavy
vesting rules regardless of whether they are top heavy, the change is
appropriate.
The change will also simplify plan design and
administration by eliminating the need for special rules for (1)
matching contributions and (2) top-heavy years. The author suggests
that this change should be accompanied by repeal - or at least further

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (2000), ERISA § 203(a)(2) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 416(b) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (2000), ERISA § 203(b) (2000).
JCT Study at 184.
26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(12) (2000), ERISA § 203(a)(4) (2000).

50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Employee

Tenure Summary, available at www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nrO.htm
visited Sept. 6, 2002).
51. Id.

(last
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simplification - of the top heavy rules, as discussed below.52
E. SIMPLE Plans
SIMPLE plans were introduced by the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA). These plans come in two forms:
SIMPLE IRAs and SIMPLE 401(k) plans. 8 Although most of the
rules are the same for both types of SIMPLE plans, there are some
differences:
*

A State or local government employer may adopt a SIMPLE
IRA but not a SIMPLE 401(k) plan;

*

The contribution rules differ: the sponsor of a SIMPLE IRA has
the option to reduce the required matching contribution, but
the sponsor of a SIMPLE 401(k) plan does not;

"

The SIMPLE IRA eligibility rules are less flexible than the
SIMPLE 401(k) eligibility rules; and

"

Under a SIMPLE IRA that provides for matching
contributions, the Code section 401(a)(17) compensation
limitation does not apply. The limitation does apply to a
SIMPLE IRA that provides for non-elective contributions, and
also to a SIMPLE 401(k) plan.5

The JCT Study addresses the first 3 differences described above
by recommending that the rules for SIMPLE IRAs and SIMPLE
401(k) plans be conformed by:
"

Allowing State and local government employers to adopt
SIMPLE 401(k) plans;

*

Applying the same contribution rules to SIMPLE IRAs and
SIMPLE 401(k) plans; and

"

Applying the employee eligibility rules for SIMPLE IRAs to
SIMPLE 401(k) plans. Though the SIMPLE IRA eligibility
rules are less flexible than the SIMPLE 401(k) rules, they are
easier to apply.5

The JCT Study does not address the discrepancy relating to the
Code section 401(a)(17) compensation limitation. The author supports
these proposals. With respect to the contribution rules, conformity
could be achieved by extending the option to reduce the required
match to SIMPLE 401(k) plans or by eliminating the option for
SIMPLE IRAs. The author recommends the former, as it provides
additional flexibility, particularly in difficult economic times, to small
employers for whom flexibility is generally very important.
52. See section III.D. infra.

53. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k)(11), 4 08 (p) (2000).
54. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(17), 408(p)(2)(B)(ii) (2000).

55. JCT Study, at 186-87.
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The difference between the rules relating to the compensation
limitation should be eliminated by extending the limitation to
SIMPLE IRAs that provide for matching contributions.
SIMPLE plans were intended to provide a less complex
retirement arrangement whose availability is restricted to smaller
employers. The proposed changes are sensible as they simplify the
rules by eliminating some unnecessary differences between the two
types of SIMPLE plans.
At present, the SIMPLE IRA generally offers more advantages to
an employer than the SIMPLE 401(k) plan. However, the JCT Study
decided against recommending repeal of the SIMPLE 401(k)
alternative:
For employers who intend to adopt a SIMPLE plan only on a temporary
basis and eventually to adopt a regular qualified retirement plan, the
ability to adopt a SIMPLE 401(k) plan may provide greater
simplification in the long term by making easier the transition from a
SIMPLE plan to a regular 401(k) plan. 56
The future of SIMPLE plans should not be considered in
isolation. In 1996, only 37% of employees of companies with fewer
than 100 employees participated in any retirement plan. We need to
continue to study why smaller employers do not sponsor plans, and to
design a plan that is responsive to their concerns. The answer may
well be that the design of the plan is far less important than the tax
incentives for sponsoring a plan.
SIMPLE plans do appear to be gaining greater acceptance.
According to the Investment Company Institute, during 2000, the
number of SIMPLE IRA plans increased by 34%, the number of
participants increased by 36%, and the assets increased by 47%.57
However, according to The 2002 Small Employer Retirement Survey

("SERS"), involving employers with 5 to 100 full-time workers, 31% of
non-sponsors have never heard of SIMPLE plans and 51% have never
heard of the other type of plan designed to appeal to small employers,
the simplified employee pension plan (SEP).58 This suggests a need
for increased educational outreach efforts by the IRS.
There appears to be no good reason to continue to allow both
SEPs and SIMPLE plans, with their confusingly different rules. In
both cases, the rules are too complex for easy comprehension by small
employers without access to expert advice, and require consideration
of numerous statutory provisions. The rules, once simplified, should
be centralized in a single Code section and, if references to other
56. JCT Study, at 187.
57. Investment Company Institute, Institute Releases Ad Hoc Survey on
SIMPLE IRAs as of June 30, 2001 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.ici.org/retirement/ simple-ira-stats62001.html.
58. The 2002 Small Employer Retirement Plan Survey (SERS), Summary of
Findings 5, available at http://www.ebri.org/sers/2002/02sersof.pdf (last visited
Sept. 6, 2002). The rules for SEPs are set out in 26 U.S.C. § 408(k) (2000).
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statutory provisions are inescapable (e.g., some limited references to
ERISA), then that Code section should include specific crossreferences.
Further, there is one rule common to SEPs and SIMPLE IRAs '9
that the employer may not restrict withdrawals by an employee that makes no sense and should be repealed.
According to the SERS, 22% of small employers offered a
SIMPLE plan, and 9% offered an SEP, 60 which suggests that SIMPLE
plans, rather than SEPs, should be retained. The 2000 SERS
concluded that:
[L]ong-term efforts to increase coverage among small employers
have the greatest potential for success if they include: education of
workers, so that they view retirement planning and saving as a
personal priority and communicate their desire for a retirement
plan to their employer; ongoing good economic conditions, so that
business profits and the affordability of plan sponsorship improve;
and policy approaches such as simplification and tax credits that
help make plans more affordable.6 '
F. Definitions of Highly Compensated Employee and Owner
Code section 414(q), which defines the term "highly compensated
employee" (HCE), whose primary purpose is in testing whether a plan
satisfies the employee coverage and nondiscrimination requirements,
including the special nondiscrimination tests (the actual deferral
percentage and actual contribution percentage tests) for 401(k)
plans. 2
Another term, "key employee," defined differently,6 is used
primarily in determining whether a plan is "top-heavy," and is also
used in testing whether a cafeteria plan or a group term life insurance
program is discriminatory.64 Other employee benefits rules hinge on
whether an individual is a 5% owner 65 or an owner-employee (as
defined in section 401(c)(3)).
The JCT Study recommends that uniform definitions be used for
all qualified plan purposes, and that many of the statutory terms and
definitions be repealed. Specifically:
1.

Five percent owner status would continue to be relevant for

59. 26 U.S.C. §§ 408(k)(4) and 408(p)(3) (2000).
60. The 2002 Small Employer Retirement Survey (SERS), Summary of Findings
3 available at http://www.ebri.org/sers/2002/02sersof.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2002).
61. The 2002 Small Employer Retirement Survey (SERS), Summary of Findings
6 available at http://www.ebri.org/sers/2002/serssummary.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2002).
62. Other employee benefit nondiscrimination tests use slightly different terms,
which are defined differently, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 105(h)(5) and 125(e) (2000).
63. See 26 U.S.C. § 416(i) (2000).
64. 26 U.S.C. §§ 125(b)(2), 79(d), 416(i) (2000).
65. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(9)(C)(ii), 127(b)(3), and 129(d)(4) (2000).
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purposes of any special rules applying to owners. 1% owner
status would be relevant for top-heavy purposes. All other
owner-related terms and their definitions would be repealed.
2.

The section 414(q) definition of HCE would apply for purposes
of the nondiscrimination requirements applicable to any taxfavored employee benefit. Any other terms or definitions for
highly compensated status would be eliminated.&

The author supports this proposal. There is no good reason why
different definitions should apply for different purposes relating to
employee benefits: the existing differences are attributable primarily
to the fact that different rules were enacted separately, in different
statutes. The changes recommended by the JCT staff would greatly
simplify plan administration by allowing employers to use a single
definition for several purposes without reducing employer flexibility
or participant security in any significant way.
One further change is also important: if the top-heavy plan
rules6 7 are retained, all references in the top-heavy rules to "key
employees" should be replaced by references to highly compensated
employees. The preference would be to repeal the top-heavy rules
completely,6 as they cause considerable additional complexity in both
the law and plan administration, while conferring little additional
benefit on plan participants. For most employers, the key employee
group and the HCE group overlap considerably, but are not identical,
and the need to identify the members of the two separate groups
causes considerable complexity for no good reason. Accordingly, in the
absence of repeal, elimination of the separate category of key
employees would achieve significant simplification.
Finally, there is an underlying problem, which may be more
difficult to address effectively. Who are employees for retirement plan
purposes? As Douglas Ell points out:
Many companies have hundreds, or even thousands, of contractual
arrangements for services .... The general standard of present law is
that a worker is considered an "employee" if the business retains the
right to control the manner in which services are performed. This
standard evokes images of factory work a hundred years ago. It is not
easy to apply to a large enterprise, with hundreds or thousands of
subcontractors and suppliers, and a variety of professionals working in
different roles. Vague concepts of "employee" create enormous problems
in administering the nondiscrimination and coverage rules.69
This issue is important for several reasons: under the exclusive
benefit rule, a qualified plan may only cover employees and self66. JCT Study, at 191.
67. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 416 (2000) (codifying special rules for top-heavy
plans).
68. See generally section III. D infra.
69. Douglas Ell, Perspective - The "Perfect"Retirement Plan, 12 BEN. L.J. 45, 46
(1999).
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employed individuals who are treated as employees; 70 ERISA covers
plans
for employees; 7'
and the employee
coverage and
nondiscrimination tests can only be performed correctly if the
employer can identify the employees (and leased employees)7' who
must be included. Some usable guidance on this topic, even if limited
to retirement plan issues, would be very helpful.
G. ContributionLimits for Tax-ShelteredAnnuities
Before 2002, contributions to a tax sheltered annuity
arrangement described in Code section 403(b) were limited, inter alia,
by the "maximum exclusion allowance" ("MEA"), a complex limitation
that applied only to 403(b) plans. The JCT Study recommends that
the contribution limits for 403(b) plans should be conformed to the
limits for qualified plans by repealing the MEA. 7' EGTRRA
has since
74
repealed the MEA for tax years beginning after 2001.
However, even after EGTRRA, there are other significant
differences between 403(b) plans and qualified plans that should be
removed, as they add complexity and do not further an apparent
policy objective. First, in the case of a 403(b) plan, a participant's
compensation for purposes of the statutory limitations on
contributions and benefits7 ' will be his or her "includible
compensation. "76 In the case of a qualified plan (including a qualified
plan maintained by an employer that is eligible to sponsor a 403(b)
plan), a different definition of compensation is used.77
Use of
"includible compensation" for purposes of section 415, a change
enacted by EGTRRA, will reinstate much of the complexity saved by
the repeal of the MEA rules, as the determination of "includible
compensation" is considerably more difficult than the determination of
415 compensation, particularly for a part-time employee.
The
qualified plan definition should be extended to 403(b) plans.
Second, for section 415 purposes, EGTRRA provides that a 403(b)
plan will be treated as a defined contribution plan maintained by each
employer with respect to which the participant has the required
control.7 " This effectively reinstates a rule that was previously

70. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), (c)(1) (2000).
71. ERISA §§ 3(1), 3(2) (2000), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1002(2) (2000). The ERISA
definition of employee is spectacularly unhelpful: "The term 'employee' means any
individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2000).
72. 26 U.S.C. § 414(n) (2000).
73. JCT Study, at 193.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) (2000).
75. 26 U.S.C. § 415 (2000).
76. 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(3) (2000).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c)(3) (2000).
78. 26 U.S.C. § 415(k)(4) (2000), as amended by § 632(b)(1) of EGTRRA (2001).
Control is determined under 26 U.S.C. § 414(b) or (c) (2000), as modified by § 415(h)
(2000).
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contained in the regulations 79 under the now-repealed Code section
415(e).
Consider the following hypothetical example that illustrates this
concept. Two physicians, A and B, are employed by a tax-exempt
hospital. They have no ownership interest in, and do not control, the
hospital. Each also maintains a separate medical practice of which
each is the 100% owner. The hospital and the practice do not
constitute an affiliated service group. Physician A participates in the
hospital's qualified plan and also in his practice's qualified plan.
Benefits under his two plans are not aggregated for 415 purposes.
However, physician B participates in the hospital's 403(b) plan and
also in her practice's qualified plan. Benefits under her two plans are
aggregated for 415 purposes. This difference cannot be justified.
Third, the dollar limits on elective deferrals are generally the
same for a 403(b) plan as for a 401(k) plan.8" However, Code §
402(g)(7) contains special rules for certain participants in 403(b) plans
that can increase the annual limit by as much as $3,000. This special
rule should be repealed.
Finally, elective deferrals under a 401(k) plan must satisfy either
a special nondiscrimination test (the ADP test) under section 401(k)(3)
or a design-based safe harbor under section 401(k)(12). Elective
deferrals under a 403(b) plan must generally be available to all
employees, 81 but the actual deferrals are not tested for discrimination.
Most of the differences between the rules for 403(b) plans and
those for 401(k) plans result from a perception that was once true, but
is no longer valid: that 403(b) arrangements are qualitatively different
from qualified plans. Section 403(b) was originally enacted in 1958 to
limit tax deferral by highly paid employees of tax-exempt employers,
and 403(b) arrangements were originally more like individual
deferred compensation agreements than employer plans. This is no
longer true: many employers, particularly those in the educational
and healthcare sectors, use 403(b) plans as their primary retirement
vehicle; others use them as supplemental retirement plans, much as
401(k) plans are used by large private sector employers.
Over the years, qualified plan rules have been extended,
sometimes with variations, to 403(b) plans, which have also been
subject to an expanding set of rules under section 403(b) itself. The
result is that 403(b) plans are no longer simple, if they ever were, and
the differences between the 401(a) and 403(b) rules are a trap for the
unwary.
Considerable simplification could be achieved by the
outright repeal of section 403(b).
Assuming that repeal does not occur in the near future, the
repeal of the MEA calculation is laudable. However, the rules for
403(b) plans (including the section 415 rules for 403(b) plans) should,
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.415-7(h) (2000).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 402(g) (2000).
81. 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(12) (2000).
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wherever possible, be the same as those for qualified plans. The
special rule illustrated by the example should be repealed.
In
EGTRRA, Congress repealed the special elections under Code §
415(c)(4) that allowed certain 403(b) plan participants a higher section
415 limit than would otherwise have been permitted. The same policy
reasons underlying this change also dictate the repeal of the higher
elective deferral limit for certain 403(b) plan participants. Finally, if
discrimination testing is appropriate for elective deferrals under a
401(k) plan (including a 401(k) plan maintained by a tax-exempt
employer), then it is appropriate for elective deferrals under a 403(b)
plan.
H. Minimum DistributionRules8 2
The Code requires retirement plan participants, IRA owners and
their beneficiaries to begin receiving distributions, generally at age
701/2.

3

The statute leaves most of the detail to be provided by

regulations. In 1987, the IRS issued complex proposed regulations,
which were never finalized. On April 16, 2002, the IRS issued final
regulations,84 which simplify the rules and will almost always reduce
the required distribution amounts.
The JCT Study recommends that the minimum distribution rules
be simplified to provide that:
1.

No distributions are required during the life of the participant;

82. See, e.g., Natalie Choate, Understanding the Final Minimum Distribution

Rules, available at http://www.ataxplan.comlarticles-fr/summary-framp.ntm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2002); David A. Pratt, The Minimum DistributionRegulations, J.
PENSION BEN. (forthcoming, Fall 2002). For articles written before the 2001 and
2002 regulations were issued, see Mark J. Warshawsky, Minimum Distribution
Requirements: Reform or Remove Them, TAX NOTES, Sept. 30, 1998, at 1133
(describing the rules as "increasingly outmoded in today's labor market and social
conditions"). See also David A. Pratt & Diane Bennett, Simplifying Retirement
Plan Distributions, 57 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 57TH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, at ch. 5-1 (1999)
(recommending that no minimum distributions be required during the lifetime of
the plan participant (or IRA owner) and, if he or she is the beneficiary, the
surviving spouse, but that the entire benefit should be fully distributed on the
death of the survivor of them). See also Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The

Minimum DistributionRules and Their Critical Role in Controllingthe Floodgates
of Qualified Plan Wealth, 2000 BYU L. REV. 587, 617-19 (2000) (recommending
that "joint life expectancy should be used only if the designated beneficiary is the
spouse" and that "[a]ccounts must be distributed within the year following the
participant's (and spouse's) death.").
83. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(9), 403(a)(1), 403(b)(10), 404(a)(2), 408(a)(6), 408(b)(3),
457(d) (2000).

84. 67 Fed. Reg. 18,988 (April 17, 2000). Previously, in January, 2001, revised
proposed regulations had been issued [66 Fed. Reg. 3928], and the final regulations
largely follow the 2001 proposed regulations. The final regulations are effective
January 1, 2003. "For determining required minimum distributions for calendar
year 2002, taxpayers may rely on these final regulations, the 2001 proposed
regulations, or the 1987 proposed regulations." 67 Fed. Reg. 18,988, 18,994.
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2.

If distributions commence during the participant's lifetime
under an annuity form of distribution, the terms of the annuity
will govern distributions after the participant's death;

3.

If distributions either do not commence during the
participant's lifetime, or commence during lifetime under a
non-annuity form of distribution, the undistributed benefit
must be distributed to the participant's beneficiaries within 5
years after the participant's death. As under current law, if
the surviving spouse is the beneficiary, he or she would be
allowed to effect a rollover. 5

The JCT proposal represents a significant improvement over the
current rules. The new regulations, though significantly less complex
than the 1987 proposed regulations, are still very difficult to work
with, even for participants and beneficiaries who have access to expert
advice. The three most pernicious aspects of the rules are that they
apply even to very small retirement benefits, are replete with traps
for the unwary, 6 and carry a confiscatory penalty for failure to
withdraw the required amount: an excise tax equal to 50% of the
shortfall.
The tax policy underlying the minimum distribution rules is that
retirement funds are accumulated and receive significant tax benefits
to provide retirement income to the employee and, if he or she is
married, to the spouse. The purpose is not to allow plan participants
to amass large estates to pass on to their heirs.88 Thus, the IRS has
applied an incidental death benefit test 89 for many years.
The
previous estate tax exclusions 9° have been repealed, and the minimum
distribution rules have been extended to all tax-favored retirement
plans in 1986.
In light of this policy, the plan participant and his or her spouse
should have considerable flexibility with respect to payments made
while either of them is alive. Accordingly, no distributions should be
required during the lifetime of the plan participant, which would have
85. JCT Study, at 196.
86. See generally LYNN ASINOF, Oops... How a Variety of Basic Foul-Ups Are
Bedeviling the Beneficiaries of IRAs, WALL ST. J., March 29, 1999, at C1 (noting
that distribution structures of most modern IRAs are "complicated and
irrevocable").
87. 26 U.S.C. § 4974 (2000), which applies to qualified plans, § 403(b) plans,
IRAs and § 457(b) plans.
88. "Uniform minimum distribution rules which establish the permissible
periods over which benefits from any tax-favored retirement arrangement may be
distributed ensure that plans are used to fulfill the purpose that justifies their taxfavored status-replacement of a participant's pre-retirement income stream at
retirement-rather than for the indefinite deferral of tax on a participant's
accumulation under the plan."

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,

99th

Cong., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 710 (Comm. Print

1987).
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2000).
90. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2039(c), (f) (2000).
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the additional benefit of bringing the rules into conformity with the
rules for Roth IRAs. In order to satisfy the minimum distribution
rules, the present temporary regulations require that annuity
distributions either be non-increasing, or increase only as specifically
permitted by the regulations. 1 This is unduly restrictive: subject to
satisfaction of applicable qualification rules (e.g., the definitely
determinable benefits rule), there should be few, if any, restrictions on
the amounts distributed during the lives of the participant and his or
her spouse. It may well be appropriate for payments to increase, for
instance to protect the participant and spouse against post-retirement
inflation or because the participant is still working part-time when
payments begin.
It is also appropriate that, if distributions commence during the
participant's lifetime under an annuity form of distribution, the terms
of the annuity should govern distributions after the participant's
death. The JCT Study does not state specifically whether the annuity
must be purchased from an insurance company: this should not be
required in the case of a defined benefit plan. Further, if the only
survivor annuitant is the surviving spouse, there should be few, if
any, restrictions on payments increasing or decreasing after the death
of the participant or IRA owner.
The third JCT proposal, that any undistributed benefit must be
distributed within 5 years after the participant's death, solves the
biggest policy problem under the current rules, the fact that payments
can continue for 70 or 80 years after the participant's death if the
designated beneficiary is very young. 92 As under current law, if the
surviving spouse is the beneficiary, he or she would be allowed to
affect a rollover. The balance in the spousal rollover IRA would be
subject to these rules at the death of the spouse.
There may need to be special rules for a narrowly defined class of
beneficiaries with disabilities, similar to the special rules governing
supplemental needs trusts. Under the 1987 and 2001 proposed
regulations, if distributions from a defined benefit plan are not in the
form of an annuity, the benefit will be treated as an individual
account for purposes of determining the minimum distribution. 93
However, the regulations provide no guidance as to how the "account
balance" is determined in this situation. Presumably it is the present
value of the participant's accrued benefit, but how is that present
value calculated? 4 Another issue on which there appears to be no
91. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6T (2000).

92. For instance, assume that a decedent names her five year-old grandson as
the designated beneficiary of her IRA, which is worth $1 million at her death. The
current rules allow the IRA to be paid out over the grandchild's life expectancy,
77.7 years. With an 8% annual return, the total payments, if the grandchild takes
only the required minimum each year, would be more than $800 million. This is
patently absurd.
93. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6 (2000) (citing Q & A 1(e)).
94. The new temporary regulations issued in April, 2002, would repeal this rule,
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formal guidance is this: if a defined benefit plan makes required
minimum distributions, in non-annuity form, how does this effect the
maximum amount which may be distributed subsequently, in a lump
sum, under section 415?
The minimum distribution rules are really aimed at a relatively
small group: those people who have large enough assets that they do
not need to use all of the income for current living expenses. In light
of this, much simplification, and possible hardships, could be avoided
by limiting the minimum distribution rules to individuals whose total
retirement asset value exceeds a certain threshold, such as $250,000.
Finally, the 50% penalty tax must be addressed. The only real
justification for this confiscatory penalty is that, for the IRS, policing
the minimum distribution rules was almost impossible, so that a
heavy penalty was required to ensure compliance. The IRS has
already introduced reporting requirements for IRAs, 95 and it should
impose similar requirements on qualified plans, 403(b) plans and 457
plans. The 50% penalty should be reduced to no more than 10%.
I. The Early Withdrawal Tax

The primary purpose of the tax subsidy for qualified plans is to
encourage individuals to save for their retirement. An important
aspect of this policy is to attempt to ensure that funds contributed to a
retirement plan continue to be held in a retirement plan until 96the
individual retires, rather than being used for current consumption.
Title 26 U.S.C. § 72(t) (2002) imposes a 10% additional income
tax on distributions from retirement plans (including IRAs) that (i)
are includible in gross income and (ii) are made before age 591 .
There are numerous exceptions, some of which apply only to qualified
plans and some of which apply only to IRAs.
Elective deferrals (and certain amounts treated as elective
deferrals) under a 401(k) plan or 403(b) plan, and all contributions to
but it remains in effect at least through 2002, and may well be reinstated when the
regulations are finalized.
95. IRS Notice 2002-27, 2002-18 I.R.B. 814.
96. This issue is discussed in detail in a recent report from the United States
Department of Labor's ERISA Advisory Council. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFITS, Report

of the Working Group on Retirement Plan Leakage: "Are We Cashing Out Our
Future?",3 (Comm. Print 1998) (the "Advisory Council Report"). The report states:
[Tihe statistics, however, show that most Americans spend their
retirement savings far in advance of retirement. The most recent
Current Population Survey determined that only 20 percent of
individuals who received lump sum distributions rolled the entire sum
into another tax-qualified vehicle. Leakage from retirement plans is a
serious threat. Popular notions of the dangers of participant loans and
hardship withdrawals are overstated. The real culprit is the temptation
to spend lump sum distributions, particularly smaller distributions and
distributions made at an early age.
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a 403(b) plan that are funded with mutual funds, rather than with
annuity contracts, may only be distributed if a distribution event has
occurred. One distribution event is attainment of age 591/2.
The JCT Study recommends that:
1. The exceptions to the early withdrawal tax under Code section 72(t)
should be uniform for all tax-favored retirement plans. This would
affect 3 exceptions currently available only for IRAs (first time
homebuyer expenses, educational expenses, and health insurance
expenses of the unemployed) and one that currently applies only to
qualified plans (separation from service at or after age 55).
Uniformity could be achieved either by extending the exceptions to
all plans or by repealing the exceptions: the JCT concluded that the
former approach would be more consistent with the policy decisions
made by Congress.97
2. The applicable age for the early withdrawal tax should be changed
from 59 to 55.98 These changes would improve the rules, but they
do not go far enough. Section 72(t) is a mess, largely because there
are now 15 separate statutory exceptions, several of which (such as
the exception for deductible medical expenses) are essentially useless
and at least one of which (the exception for substantially equal
payments) is used almost exclusively by wealthier individuals.
I recommend the following changes. First, the only exceptions
should be those for death and disability, and for distributions that are
actually and irrevocably annuitized. Second, age 59/2 should be
changed to age 55, a common early retirement age under employer
plans. Third, a 10% tax is clearly not sufficient to deter premature
withdrawals and spending of retirement savings. One approach
would be to increase the tax significantly, but this would
disproportionately affect lower income plan participants, including
some who have immediate needs for which they must use the money.
A better approach is to significantly limit, or eliminate, the right to
receive withdrawals from a qualified plan or 403(b) plan before a
certain age, by requiring a direct rollover to an IRA or another
qualified plan, of all distributions other than annuity payments. A
more radical change would extend this requirement to IRAs: this
would eliminate the SEP and SIMPLE IRA withdrawal problem. The
penalty for noncompliance would be a substantial penalty tax.
J. 401(k) Plansfor Governmental Employers
Most state and local government employers are prohibited from
maintaining a 401(k) plan, subject to an exception for certain grand-

97. JCT Study, at 199-201.
98. Id.
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fathered plans. 99 The JCT Study recommends that all state and local
governments should be permitted to maintain 401(k) plans.'00 The
current rule makes absolutely no sense, and this change should be
made.
Unfortunately, by enacting additional tax advantages for
governmental 457 plans in EGTRRA, Congress appears to have taken
a different tack. I suggest that it would be greatly preferable, for both
policy and simplification reasons, to allow governmental employers to
sponsor 401(k) plans. We should then examine whether there were
any adequate justifications for continuing to allow governmental 457
plans.
K Section 457 Plans
As originally enacted, Code section 457 applied only to deferred
compensation plans of governmental employers. TRA 86 extended its
application to deferred compensation plans of private tax-exempt
employers other than churches. Subsequent legislation (including
major changes enacted by EGTRRA) has resulted in section 457 (i)
being very complex and (ii) including rules that differ significantly for
private and public sector employers. As the JCT Study notes:
Despite the differences between section 457 plans maintained by State
and local governments and plans maintained by tax-exempt
organizations, the same Code provision deals with both types of plans.
This causes drafting complexity in that employers and practitioners
must review all the rules under section 457 in order to determine those
that apply to its plan.'
The JCT Study recommends that the statutory provisions should
be redrafted so that separate provisions apply to (i) plans maintained
by state and local governments and (ii) plans maintained by private
tax-exempt organizations. 10 2 The need for such a redrafting has
become more pressing as a result of the major changes to section 457,
particularly for governmental 457 plans, enacted by EGTRRA.
However if, as recommended above, governmental employers are
again allowed to maintain 401(k) plans, is there still a need for
governmental 457 plans?
As a practical matter, because of ERISA, participation in private
sector 457 plans is limited to a select group of management or highly
compensated employees. By contrast, governmental 457 plans are
generally available to all employees of the sponsoring employer, and
many of them, such as the New York State Deferred Compensation
Plan, have billions of dollars in assets. Governmental 457 plans must
now be funded.'0 ' EGTRRA has further reduced the differences
between governmental 457 plans and governmental qualified plans,
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(4)(B) (2000).
JCT Study, at 202.
Id. at 204.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 457(g) (2000).
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for instance by allowing rollovers.'04 Accordingly, we should consider
whether section 457 should be repealed with respect to governmental
employers, by making existing governmental 457 plans subject to the
same rules as apply to governmental qualified plans. We should also
consider whether, and the extent to which, the discrepancies between
the 457 rules and the qualified plan rules can be justified. As
amended by EGTRRA, the rules for governmental 457 plans result in
an uneasy hybrid, with some features of a qualified plan and some
features of a nonqualified plan, that are difficult to justify from a
policy perspective.
The application of section 457 to private tax-exempt employers
should also be reviewed, in the light of experience since the section
was enacted in 1978. The stated rationale for enactment of more
stringent rules governing nonqualified deferred compensation in taxexempt organizations than in taxable organizations is that, for a
taxable employer, the deferral of the tax deduction for nonqualified
deferred compensation (as compared to the immediate deduction for
current salary or a contribution to a qualified plan) is a deterrent to
providing overly generous deferred compensation programs. Recent
experience with executive compensation in the private sector suggests
that this premise is flawed. In addition, since Congress extended
section 457 to private sector tax-exempts in 1986, Congress has
enacted the intermediate sanctions rules, which impose significant
new restrictions on compensation for executives of tax-exempt
organizations. 0
There are at least two reasons for reconsidering the
application of section 457 to these private organizations: first, it may
not be necessary, because of the new intermediate sanction rules;
second, it puts tax-exempt employers (such as hospitals) at an unfair
disadvantage in competing for executives with taxable employers. If
Code Section 457 is retained, for governmental employers and/or
private tax-exempt employers, then its scope, and the scope of the
exceptions to its application, must be clarified as soon as possible.
The recent proposed regulations, 6° though comprehensive in most
respects, do not address these areas. Section 457 includes a crazy
quilt of special rules relating to (1) "bona fide" vacation leave, sick
leave, compensatory time, severance pay, disability pay and death
benefit plans (these terms are not defined in any way)0 7 and (2) length
of service awards for volunteers. 00 Clarification of these rules is long
overdue.
104. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, Present Law and Background Relating to
Employer-Sponsored Defined Contribution Plans and Other Retirement
Arrangements and ProposalsRegarding Defined Contribution Plans (Comm. Print
2002), reprinted in 2002 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., DAILY TAX REPORT 39
DTR L-1 (2002).
105. 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2000).
106. 67 Fed. Reg. 3,0826, May 8, 2002.
107. 26 U.S.C. § 457(e)(11)(A) (2000).
108. Id. at §§ 457(e)(11)(B), (C) (2000).
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L. Uniform Ownership AttributionRules
Under the qualified plan rules, different ownership attribution
rules apply for different purposes. For example, the Code section 1563
rules are used in determining controlled group status,"' but the
section 318 rules are used to determine whether someone is a 5%
owner under the top-heavy rules.1 The JCT Study recommends:
1.

that the attribution rules used in determining controlled
group status under Code section 1563 should be used in
determining ownership for all qualified plan purposes,"' and

2.

the use of a uniform definition of family members in applying
ownership attribution2 rules for all Code purposes, including the
qualified plan rules.1

Implementation of the proposal would simplify plan
administration. Each set of attribution rules is inherently difficult to
apply. Implementation of the proposal would enable an employer to
perform a single ownership analysis for all qualified plan purposes.
M. Basis Recovery Rules
Under current law, there are different basis recovery rules for
qualified plans IRAs and Roth IRAs." 3 The JCT Study recommends a
uniform basis recovery rule. Distributions would be attributable to
basis first, 4 and thus not taxable, until the entire basis has been
recovered."1
The proposal should be implemented. Despite some recent
simplifications,"' the calculation of the portion of each distribution
that is attributable to basis is unnecessarily difficult, often involving
the application of special grandfather rules. Also, there is no good
policy reason to have different basis recovery rules for different types
of retirement savings vehicles, particularly given the greatly relaxed
rollover rules under EGTRRA.
The JCT Study also recommends that Code section 72 be
redrafted to improve readability. 6 This change is long overdue. Code
section 72 is entitled "Annuities; certain proceeds of endowment and
life insurance contracts." However, in addition to governing the
income taxation of insurance products, section 72 governs the taxation
of most distributions from qualified plans and IRAs, determines when

109. Id. at § 414(b) (2000).
110. Id. at § 416(i)(1)(B) (2000).
111. JCT Study, at 209.
112. Id. at 253.
113. 26 U.S.C. §§ 72(d), 408(d)(2), 408A(d)(4) (2000).
114. JCT Study, at 220.
115. For example, the enactment of the simplified method of taxing annuity
payments from a qualified plan. 26 U.S.C. § 72(d)(1) (2000).
116. JCT Study, at 362.
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plan loans are treated as distributions,"7 and provides a 10%
additional income tax for most distributions made before age 591/
from retirement plans and IRAs."' As a result, section 72 is lengthy
and convoluted.
The JCT Study recommends that the provisions of section 72
that apply to qualified plans should be separated from section 72 and
combined with the other rules governing the taxation of distributions
from such plans. 9 It is highly unsatisfactory that the primary Code
section dealing with the taxation of retirement plan distributions also
includes numerous provisions that have nothing to do with retirement
plans. The Code would be much more user-friendly if all of the rules
relating to taxation of retirement plan distributions were in the same
part of the Code. All provisions relating to retirement plans should be
included in a revised section 402, and the revised section 402 should
include cross-references to other Code sections that govern the
taxation of retirement arrangements other than qualified plans, such
as IRAs and Roth IRAs.
III. SIMPLIFICATION PROPOSALS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE
JCT STUDY
A. Reduce The Number of Different Types of Defined Contribution
Plan
Under current law, an employer wishing to sponsor a qualified
defined contribution plan may adopt:
* a profit-sharing plan (without a 401(k) feature);
* a 401(k) plan (which comes in three varieties- traditional,
SIMPLE or safe harbor);
* a money purchase pension plan (including a target benefit
plan);
* a stock bonus plan, or an ESOP (leveraged or non-leveraged).
If the employer adopts a defined contribution plan that is not a
"qualified plan", subject to the rules of section 401(a), the
employer may adopt:
1 20
" a simplified employee pension plan (SEP);

"

12
an employer-sponsored IRA; 1

" a tax-sheltered annuity program, if eligible;
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

26 U.S.C. § 72(p) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 72(t) (2000).
JCT Study, at 362.
26 U.S.C. § 408(k) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 408(c) (2000).
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&a 457 plan; or

* a SIMPLE

IRA.123

Each type of plan is subject to a different set of rules, none of
which are simple. Beginning in 2006, there will also be Roth 401(k)
plans and Roth 403(b) plans. It is almost impossible even for a
pension expert to keep all these rules straight, and to 1advise
a client
24
adequately as to which type of plan is best for its needs.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"), in 1996
there were 63,657 defined benefit plans and 632,566 defined
contribution
plans, 497,173 of which were profit-sharing or thrift
12
plans. 5
The ability of a tax-exempt employer to adopt a 401(k) plan has
eliminated the need for 403(b) plans. The best approach would be to
repeal section 403(b). If this is not politically possible, then the
fallback position would be to harmonize the rules for 401(k) plans and
403(b) plans to eliminate the ludicrous and indefensible differences
that exist under current law.
Similarly, there is no longer any real justification for having
different rules for money purchase (including target benefit) plans and
profit-sharing plans.
The differences result from the pre-ERISA
classification of the former as pension plans, and the differences are
no longer appropriate: beginning in 2002, there is no longer even a
different deduction limitation.1 26 Pamela Perun and Eugene Steuerle
have recommended:
[tihe creation of a single, standard form of defined contribution plan. It
would replace the multiple plan types now available as well as the
separate, "simplified," set of plans for small employers. Such a plan is
feasible because, now that contributions to profit-sharing plans no
longer depend on employer profits, the historical rationale for
maintaining separate money purchase, stock bonus and profit-sharing
plans no longer exists. The principle [sic] remaining differences among
the plans are whether the formula is fixed or discretionary, what
spousal rights attach to benefits, what limit on deductible contributions
122. 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) (2000).
123. 26 U.S.C. § 408(p) (2000).
124. Gene Steuerle asks:
Do we need both traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs, both profit-sharing and
employee stock option plans, both money purchase and profit-sharing plans,
both 401(k) and 403(b) plans? My feeling is that the gains from these
differentiations are small, if any, and the costs of administration are almost
inevitably higher than any gains.
Gene Steuerle, Why PensionSimplification Is So Difficult to Achieve, 80 TAx NOTES
253 (1998).
125.

PENSION AND

WELFARE

BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF

POLICY

RESEARCH, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, Abstract of 1996 Form 5500 Annual

Reports, no.9, (Winter 1999-2000).
126. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2000).
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should apply, and how benefits may be distributed, that is, in cash or in
stock. These are not difficult design issues. It should be relatively easy
to compromise on a standard form of plan with sufficient flexibility to be
attractive to small and large employers alike.' 27
B. Minimum FundingRules
One of the primary goals of ERISA was to improve the funding of
defined benefit plans. 28
Accordingly, ERISA enacted minimum
funding rules. 29 If the employer fails to contribute to the plan an
amount at least equal to the required minimum, it becomes subject to
a 10% first tier excise tax and,
unless the under-funding is corrected,
30
a 100% second tier excise tax.
Profit-sharing plans, 401(k) plans, stock bonus plans, and ESOPs
are generally not subject to any minimum funding rules (if a cash or
deferred arrangement (CODA) is part of a pre-ERISA money purchase
plan, or if an ESOP includes a money purchase plan, then the money
purchase portion is subject to the minimum funding requirements).
By contrast, money purchase pension plans (including target benefit
plans) are subject to the minimum funding rules. 2 '
The minimum funding requirements should apply only to defined
benefit plans. Consider the following plan designs:
1.

The plan provides that the employer will contribute 5% of
compensation for each eligible participant. The plan states that
it is a money purchase pension plan.

2.

The plan provides that the employer will contribute 5% of
compensation for each eligible participant. The plan states that
it is a profit-sharing plan.

3.

The plan provides that the employer will contribute 50% of
elective deferrals for each eligible participant who made
deferrals during the year. The plan states that it is a profitsharing plan that includes a CODA.

In each case, the employer has made a contractual commitment
to contribute to the plan, that commitment is not contingent upon
127. PAMELA PERUN & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, ERISA at 50: A Model for the
Private Pension System, ALI-ABA PENSION POLICY CONFERENCE: ERISA AFTER 25
YEARS, Oct. 1, 1999.
128. Congress found that "owing to the inadequacy of current minimum
standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to
pay promised benefits may be endangered." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
129. 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2000); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081 et seq. (2000). The deadline for
making the contribution for a plan year is 8
months after the end of the plan
year. 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(10) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 11.412(c)-12 (2000). If the
employer is even one day late, the full excise tax is payable. This deadline is not
always the same as the deadline for making deductible contributions. 26 U.S.C. §
404(a)(6) (2000).
130. 26 U.S.C. § 4971 (2000).
131. 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2000); 29 U.S.C. 1082 (2000).
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profits and, if the employer fails to honor its commitment, the eligible
participants can sue under ERISA or request the DOL to sue on their
behalf to enforce the plan provisions. In the first case, if the employer
fails to contribute the amount specified, the employer has also
violated the minimum funding requirements, and is liable for an
excise tax equal to 10% of the shortfall. The profit-sharing plan and
401(k) plan described in numbers two and three above are not subject
to the minimum funding standards, so an employer which fails to
make the contributions described in the plan incurs no excise tax
liability.
There is no significant distinction between these three cases.
The increased deduction limits for profit-sharing and 401(k) plans
under EGTRRA are likely to result in a substantial reduction in the
number of active money purchase plans; those that continue should
not be subject to the minimum funding rules.
The funding rules of section 412 have been tinkered with so
much since the enactment of ERISA that the section is almost
impossible to read. Consideration should be given to simplifying the
rules, as many of the mid-stream changes have added more
complexity than they are worth. A good start would be to eliminate
the section 412(1) deficit reduction contribution and replace it with
shorter amortization periods.
C. DiscriminationRules for Elective Deferrals
Elective deferrals under a 403(b) plan, unlike elective deferrals
under a 401(k) plan, must generally be made available to all
employees, with limited exceptions. 132 However, elective deferrals
under a 403(b) plan are not subject to any discrimination test similar
to the actual deferral percentage ("ADP") test1 33 for elective deferrals
under a 401(k) plan. Further, certain 403(b) plan participants are
allowed a higher dollar limit on elective deferrals than 401(k) plan
participants or other 403(b) plan participants."M
It has been suggested above that there is no longer any sufficient
reason to have 403(b) plans as well as 401(k) plans. If 403(b) plans
are to be retained, then the rules should be harmonized with the
401(k) plan rules. As the JCT Study suggests, "further simplification
could be achieved by conforming all the rules for the various elective
deferral arrangements available to all employers." 3' The universal
availability rule for 403(b) plans should be replaced by the 401(k) plan
eligibility rules. At the very least, the scope of some of the exceptions
to the rule is unclear, and further guidance would be helpful.
Elective deferrals under a 403(b) plan should be subject to a
nondiscrimination test similar to the ADP test for 401(k) plans. Why
132.
133.
134.
135.

26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(12)(A)(ii) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(3) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 402(g)(7) (2000).
JCT Study, at 187.
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should a tax-exempt employer that sponsors a 403(b) plan be treated
more favorably than a taxable employer, or a tax-exempt employer,
that sponsors a 401(k) plan? Extension of the ADP test to 403(b)
plans may significantly reduce the amount of deferrals available to
faculty members of law schools and medical schools, and physicians
and executives employed by hospitals, but this result is perfectly
acceptable from a policy viewpoint.
There is an argument that this would prove burdensome for
small tax-exempts, but it would be no more burdensome than the ADP
test is for small businesses. And, in either case, the burden can be
mitigated if the employer adopts a safe harbor plan or a SIMPLE
plan. Under current law, a tax-exempt employer need concern itself
with discrimination testing only if it has at least one employee who
earned more than $85,000 during the preceding year. 13 6 While this is
hardly wealth beyond the dreams of avarice, it is hard to argue that a
tax-exempt organization which can afford a salary at this level is
entitled to more solicitude than a small business, given that many
small business owners earn substantially less than this amount.
D. Top-Heavy Plans
If a plan is top-heavy, because more than 60% of the accumulated
benefits under the plan are provided for "key employees," then the
plan is required to provide accelerated vesting and minimum
contributions or benefits.137
Considerable simplification could be
achieved by repealing the top-heavy rules. In a recent report,"' the
General Accounting Office (GAO) found that, in certain cases, the topheavy plan rules require greater benefits to be provided to non-key
employees than would be required by the other nondiscrimination
rules. The GAO report also stated, contrary to the experience of most
pension practitioners, that the top-heavy rules impose only slight
additional burdens on plans sponsors. The report concluded that
[i]n evaluating the top-heavy rules' impact, the federal government must
weigh the extent to which the rules may in fact discourage pension
coverage against the higher benefit levels and faster vesting schedules
the top-heavy rules have brought about for certain workers, a task made
difficult by the lack of quantifiable information. 139
The GAO report understates the regulatory burden on all
qualified plans resulting from the retention of top-heavy rules which
actually affect only a small number of plans, almost all of which are
very small.140 The better view is stated in a 1998 report issued by a
136. 26 U.S.C. § 414(q) (2000).
137. 26 U.S.C. § 416 (2000).
138. Private Pensions: "Top-Heavy" Rules for Owner-Dominated Plans,
GAO/HEHS-00-141, August, 2000, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, 2000 TNT 19316, availableat http://www.lexis.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
139. Id.
140. According to the GAO, approximately 84% of all top-heavy plans established
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working group of the ERISA Advisory Council, 4' which recommended
repeal of the top-heavy rules:
The top-heavy rules under Internal Revenue Code Section 416 should be
repealed. They no longer provide significant protections to rank and file
employees. Their effect is largely duplicated by other rules enacted
subsequently. Despite their limited utility, all employers must test for
top-heaviness. Since most small employers are not capable of performing
these tests on their own, they represent an additional and largely
unnecessary cost of maintaining a qualified retirement plan. They also
create a perception within the small business community that pension
laws target small businesses for potential abuses. This too discourages
small business from establishing qualified retirement plans for their
employees."
If and to the extent that the general coverage and
nondiscrimination regulations under sections 401(a)(4) and 410(b) are
thought to be, without the backstop of the top-heavy rules, inadequate
to prevent abuses, then the better approach is to tighten those rules,
not to retain the top-heavy rules.
The top-heavy rules were simplified somewhat by section 613 of
EGTRRA. Assuming that the top-heavy rules are not repealed, further
changes are still required. First, the definition of the minimum
contribution to a top-heavy defined contribution plan 4 ' should be
modified by (1) making it identical to the nonelective contribution
under a safe harbor 401(k) plan,'" and (2) repealing the rule 146 that
elective deferrals by employees are included in calculating the highest
contribution rate for any key employee. Second, as suggested above,
considerable simplification would result from replacing references to
key employees and non-key employees with references to HCEs and
NHCEs.

in 1996, the most recent year for which data were available, had fewer than 10
participants. The GAO reported that:
While 52 percent of plans with 2 to 9 participants reported being topheavy, the proportion dropped to 14 percent of plans with 10 to 24
participants, 5 percent of plans with 25 to 49 participants, and 3 percent
in the 50- to 99- participant range. Only 2 percent of plans with 100 or
more participants reported top-heavy status.
Id.
141. ERISA Advisory Council, Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and
Benefit Plans, Report of the Working Group on Small Business: How to Enhance
and Encourage the Establishment of Pension Plans, (Nov. 13, 1998), available at
www.dol.gov/pwba/public/adcoun/smrptl.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
142. Id.
143. The minimum contribution is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 416(c)(2) (2000).
144. The non-elective employer contribution to a safe harbor 401(k) plan is
defined in 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(12)(C) (2000).
145. This rule is found in 26 U.S.C. § 416(c)(2)(B)(i) (2000), as explained by
Question and Answer M-20 in Treas. Reg. § 1.416-1 (2000).
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E. Incidental Benefits
Under the pre-ERISA regulations, profit-sharing plans may
provide "incidental" life and health insurance benefits.146 Pension
plans may provide "incidental" life insurance protection, and may also
provide health insurance for retirees (and their spouses and
dependents), but not for active employees. 147 Second-to-die life
insurance is permitted in a profit-sharing plan, 48 but the IRS has
ruled that a pension plan which permits a participant to invest a
portion of his or her account in a life insurance policy on the life of
another person will not qualify. 49 There appears to be no good reason
for the differences summarized above, but then is there really any
good reason why qualified plans should be complicated by including
ancillary benefits unrelated to the primary purpose of the planproviding retirement income?'50 Subject to transition rules, incidental
health and death benefits should no longer be permitted to be part of
a qualified, plan. The fall back position is that, if such benefits
continue to be permitted, the rules should be uniform for all types of
qualified plans.
F. Special Rules for Owner-Employees
Before the enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA), plans covering "owner-employees" and other
self-employed individuals were subject to significantly more
restrictive rules than other plans. Since TEFRA, most of the
differences have been eliminated, but several distinctions remain.
After EGTRRA, the remaining differences are as follows:
1. Contributions made on behalf of an owner-employee may be
made only with respect to earned income derived from the
trade or business with respect to which the plan is
established."s

146. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (2000).
147. 26 U.S.C. § 401(h) (2000); Treas. Reg. §§1.401-1(b)(1)(i), -14(c)(1) (2000).

148. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-45-095 (Aug. 13, 1984); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii)

(2000).
149. Rev. Rul. 69-523, 1969-2 CB 90.

150. David A. Pratt and Diane Bennett explain:
It appears that fewer qualified plans now buy life insurance than in the
past. The Department of Labor frequently has expressed its concerns
about defined contribution plans investing in cash value insurance. Few
plans have ever provided health insurance. Accordingly, we suggest
that the rules allowing plans to provide incidental benefits be repealed.
This would eliminate some complexity and would further the goal of
uniform rules for all retirement plans, because IRAs are not allowed to
provide these incidental benefits. These benefits can be provided easily
under a separate welfare plan that is not subject to all of the complex
pension rules.
Pratt & Bennett, supra note 82.
151. 26 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2000).
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2.

The definition of "earned income" of a self-employed individual
does not correspond
precisely to the "compensation" used for
152
employees.

3.

For a self-employed individual, although separation from
service is not, disability is a triggering event for lump sum
distribution treatment. For an employee, the reverse is true. 153

4.

Deductible contributions on behalf of a self-employed
individual are limited to his or her earned income derived from
the trade or business with respect to which the
plan is
4
established, and may not be used to buy insurance.1

The term "owner-employee" is defined to include sole proprietors,
more than 10% partners (this includes members of an LLC that has
elected to be taxed as a partnership), and more than 5% S Corporation
shareholders.' 55
These few remaining special rules should be repealed. There is
no policy reason for these remaining distinctions, and their
elimination has become more important because of the increasing
popularity of limited liability companies (LLCs). If the definition of
"owner-employee" retains any significance, it should be simplified.
One possible approach, though it is much less simple than repeal,
would be to replace all references to "owner-employees" with
156
references to 5% owners.
G. PermissibleInvestments
As a general rule, a qualified plan has a very broad range of
permissible investments, subject to few limitations:
1.

The plan and its fiduciaries must comply with the prudence,
diversification and prohibited transaction rules, and with any
limitations imposed by the plan documents, and must avoid
engaging in any "prohibited transaction. 157

2.

There are limitations on the acquisition and holding of employer
securities and employer real property. 15 A defined benefit plan or
money purchase plan (unless it is part of an ESOP) must generally
limit investment in qualifying employer securities and qualifying
employer real property to 10% of its assets."59 A profit-sharing plan,
stock bonus plan or ESOP is an "eligible individual account plan"
which can, if the plan so permits, and subject to ERISA fiduciary

152. 26 U.S.C. § 401(c)(2)(A) (2000).
153. 26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4)(D) (2000).
154. 26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(8), (e) (2000).
155. 26 U.S.C. § 401(c)(3) (2000).
156. See 26 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(B)(i) (2000) (defining '5% owner').
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(B), (C), (D), 1106 (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 4975 (2000).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (2000). See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107(d)(5) and (e) (2000).
(defining 'qualifying employer security').
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rules, invest up to 100% of its assets therein.

60

3.

The amount invested in life insurance contracts
must be limited, so
6
that the death benefit remains "incidental".1 1

4.

Acquisition of a collectible, by an6 2 individually directed account, is
treated as a taxable distribution.'

The investments available to a 403(b) plan are much more
limited: unless the employer is a church, the plan may invest only in
annuity contracts issued by an insurance company or in regulated
investment company stock (mutual funds). 6' However, if the plan is a
defined contribution program (or a grand-fathered defined benefit
arrangement), and the employer is a church or a convention or
association of churches, including a church-controlled organization,
the employer may maintain a retirement income account,'6 which has
all of the investment alternatives available to a qualified plan and, if
it is exempt from ERISA (as most church plans are),16' it will not be
subject to the ERISA restrictions. It would, however, be subject to any
restrictions imposed by state law.
A SEP or SIMPLE IRA has a much broader range of permissible
investments than a 403(b) plan, but is subject to the investment
restrictions that apply to all IRAs (e.g., no life insurance and no loans
to the IRA owner),6 67 and acquisition of a collectible is treated as a
taxable distribution.
There are no explicit investment restrictions for section 457
plans. If the plan is exempt from ERISA, then it will be subject to any
limitations imposed by state law.
The author suggests section 403(b) should be repealed. If 403(b)
plans are retained, there appears to be no reason why 403(b) plans
should have fewer investment options than qualified plans, and the
existing restrictions should be repealed. Undoubtedly, many sponsors
of 403(b) plans will, like many 401(k) plan sponsors, continue to invest
with insurance companies and mutual fund families, but they should
have the opportunity to use other investments.
H. ProhibitedTransactions
Retirement plans are subject to extensive prohibited transaction

160. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107(b), (d)(3)(A) (2000). Certain pre-ERISA money purchase
plans also qualify as eligible individual account plans 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)(A)
(2000).
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i), (ii) (2000).
162. 26 U.S.C. § 408(m) (2000).
163. 26 U.S.C. §§ 403(b)(1), (7) (2000).
164. 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(9) (2000).
165. See ERISA § 4(b)(2) (2000), (describing exemption of church plans from
coverage under ERISA; the term "church plan" is defined in ERISA § 3(33) (2000)).
166. 26 U.S.C. §§ 408(a)(3), (e)(2) (2000).
167. 26 U.S.C. § 408(m) (2000).
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rules under both the Code and ERISA.'6
The prohibition is
categorical, and does not depend on any finding that the transaction is
inappropriate or unfair to the plan. For instance, an employer is
generally not allowed to contribute publicly traded securities (even if
unencumbered) to a pension plan, even though there would be little or
no risk to the plan.
There is an extensive and complex set of statutory and
regulatory exemptions.' 69 It is also possible for a fiduciary to apply to
7
DOL for an individual exemption.1 0
Violation of these rules, even if inadvertent, can result in
enormous penalties. The Code imposes a first tier excise tax equal to
15% of the amount involved in the transaction. 7' If the transaction is
not corrected, then there is a second tier excise tax equal to 100% of
the amount involved. 72 In Comm'r v Keystone Consolidated Indus.,
Inc.,' 3 the IRS assessed almost $13 million in excise taxes.7
In
Zabolotny v. Comm'r"7 5, the total assessment was over $8 million. 176 In
the absence of proof of willful malfeasance, these penalties seem
grossly disproportionate, and are likely to affect the employer's ability
and willingness to continue to fund the plan.
The breadth of the rules is illustrated by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Harris Trust and Say. Bank v Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc.177 Salomon provided broker-dealer services to the
plaintiff pension plan by executing non-discretionary equity trades at
the direction of the plan's fiduciaries. Salomon was not a fiduciary
but, as a service provider, was automatically classified as a party in
interest with respect to the plan. During the same period, in
transactions totally unrelated to its role as broker-dealer, Salomon
sold to the plan interests in several motel properties for about $21
million: these investments were directed by the plan's investment
manager. The plaintiffs discovered that the motel interests were
nearly worthless, and claimed that they had been worthless all along.
As the motel transactions were between the plan and a party in
interest, the Court assumed that the transactions were prohibited by
ERISA and, on that assumption, held that the Trustee of the plan
could sue Salomon, as a non-fiduciary party in interest to a prohibited
transaction, for restitution under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. 78
There is also doubt as to whether the prohibited transaction
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

26 U.S.C. § 4975; ERISA § 406 (2000).
26 U.S.C. §§ 4975(c)(2), (d) (2000); ERISA § 408 (2000).
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 4975(a) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 4975(b) (2000).
508 U.S. 152, 156 (1993).
Id. at 156.
7 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 775.
530 U.S. 238 (2000).
Id. at 241.
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rules actually provide any real protection to employees:
Several experienced ERISA attorneys were recently asked if they were
aware of any case in which these rules had prevented or punished some
abusive act that was not also proscribed by the general fiduciary rules.
None could identify a single case. If there are any such cases, the DOL
should identify them so that it would be possible to weigh 79the beneficial
value against the easily identifiable cost these rules exact.1
Congress should require the Treasury Department, the IRS and
the DOL to conduct a comprehensive study, involving public input, to
report to Congress on limiting the scope of the present rules and
clarifying those that remain in effect. Although 27 years have passed
since ERISA was enacted, the precise scope of some of the prohibitions
and exemptions is still not clear, introducing undesirable uncertainty
into plan administration and conferring too much power on DOL, the
agency responsible for enforcing the rules. A comprehensive review of
these rules is long overdue. In addition, the exemption process should
8
be made quicker and more efficient."'
The prohibited transaction
rules also apply to IRAs, though their application to IRAs is often
difficult to analyze. In addition, if an IRA is involved in a prohibited
transaction, the sanction is extremely severe: the entire value of the
account becomes immediately taxable.'18
The prohibitions are so
broad that it would be impossible to operate any plan without the
1812
network of exemptions.
The study should also consider whether any prohibited
transaction rules are appropriate for retirement arrangements that do
not involve an employer, i.e., most regular, rollover and Roth IRAs.
Also, to the extent that the rules continue to apply to IRAs, the
sanction for a prohibited transaction by an IRA should be made more
reasonable.
I. Payment of Benefits
Pension plans (defined benefit or defined contribution) generally
are not allowed to make in-service distributions, unless the employee
has attained normal retirement age or the plan has terminated.'9 A
179. Kathleen P. Utgoff & Theodore R. Groom, The Regulation of Pensions:
Twenty Questions After Twenty Years, 21 J. PENSION PLANNING & COMPLIANCE 1,
13 (1995).
180. See Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation of
PWBA's "Prohibited Transactions" Exemptions Process, Report No. 2E-12-0010003, September 21, 2000 (describing ways whereby PWBA can improve efficiency
in the areas of staffing and information technology), available at
http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reportsoace/fy2000/2el20010003.pdf (last visited July
6, 2002).
181. 26 U.S.C. § 408(e)(2) (2000).
182. As Langbein and Wolk have asked, "Ought a regulatory scheme to be so
overinclusive that it is unworkable without an extensive law of exemptions?"
Langbein & Wolk, supra note 28 at 705.
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2000); TIR 1403, Q & A M-15; Rev. Rul. 69-
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plan may specify that any age less than 65 is the normal retirement
age.18

Profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans and ESOPs may (with
the exception of elective deferrals under a 401(k) plan and certain

other amounts, such as qualified matching contributions (QMACs),
qualified non-elective contributions (QNECs) and the required
matching or non-elective contribution to a safe harbor 401(k) plan)
incorporate liberal in-service distribution rules.' 85
The rules for 403(b) plans differ, depending on
whether the funds
18 6
are invested in annuity contracts or mutual funds.
Employer contributions to a SEP may not be conditioned on any
portion of the contribution being kept in the account, and the
employer may not prohibit withdrawals from the SEP.187 A similar
rule applies to SIMPLE IRAs.'8
If the present value of the participant's benefit under a plan
exceeds $5,000, the benefit may not be distributed, prior to the later of
age 62 or normal retirement age, without the participant's consent. 89
If the value of the benefit does not exceed $5,000, the benefit may be
distributed without the participant's consent, and without complying
with the annuity rules.' 90 This rule sends the (wrong) message that
these relatively small distributions are not worth bothering about.
For many low-income employees, the best they can expect from the
pension system may be a series of small payouts each time they
change jobs. For instance, if a 30-year old employee receives a $5,000
cash-out and earns a 9% annual return, it will be worth $80,000 by
the time he or she reaches age 62. According to one report, only 20%
of distributions under $3,500 were rolled over, compared to 95% of
distributions over $100,000.'9' Also, the rollover rate was 89% for
individuals aged 60 or older, but only 26% for those aged 20-29.'92
277, 1969-1 C.B. 116; Rev. Rul. 71-24, 1971-1 C.B. 114.
184. Rev. Rul. 78-120, 1978-1 C.B. 117.
185. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (2000); Rev. Rul. 60-323, 1960-2 C.B. 148,
modifying Rev. Rul. 56-693, 1956-2 C.B. 282. For the special restrictions, see 26
U.S.C. §§ 401(k)(2)(B) (elective deferrals) and 401(k)(12)(E)(i) (2000) (safe harbor
401(k) plans) and Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(g)(13)(iii) (2000) (QMACs and QNECs).
186. 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(7)(A)(ii), (b)(11) (2000).
187. 26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(4) (2000).
188. 26 U.S.C. § 408(p)(3) (2000).
189. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(11) (2000), ERISA § 203(e) (2000) (29 U.S.C. § 1053(e)
(2000)), Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(4) (2000).
190. 26 U.S.C. § 417(e) (2000); ERISA § 205(g) (2000) (29 U.S.C. § 1055(g)
(2000)). For distributions made on or after January 1, 2000, any benefits
attributable to rollovers may be disregarded in determining whether the $5,000
threshold is exceeded.
191. U°S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE
AND PENSION BENEFITS, Working Group on Retirement Plan Leakage, Are We

Cashing Out Our Future? November 13, 1998 at 8, (citing the 1996 Hewitt
database), available at http://www.dol.gov/pwba/adcoun/leaknewl.htm (last visited
July 6, 2002).
192. Id.
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The inability of an employer to restrict withdrawals from a SEP
or SIMPLE IRA significantly undermines their effectiveness as
retirement savings arrangements. There appears to be no good policy
reason for this rule, and it should be repealed.
All retirement plans and IRAs should be subject to a uniform set
of distribution rules. The current distribution rules are not well
understood. Many people believe, incorrectly, that a distribution from
a profit-sharing plan may be made at any time at all, if the plan so
provides. The differences in the distribution rules, applicable to
different types of plan, serve no useful purpose, and are a trap for the
unwary. In addition, they fail to fulfill the goal of preserving funds for
retirement, as a large proportion of pre-retirement distributions are
"simply spent, rather than being transferred to another retirement
program, such as a rollover IRA.
It is time-consuming and inefficient to have several separate sets
of rules, and the complexity of the rules for elective deferrals is
particularly troubling given the ever-increasing prevalence of 401(k)
plans. It is understandable that Congress wished to restrict the
ability of employees to use 401(k) deferrals as short-term savings
arrangements but, rather than enacting special restrictions, the better
approach would be to limit access to employees' interests in all types
of tax-favored retirement arrangements, including IRAs and 403(b)
plans. The ultimate goal is to preserve these funds for retirement,
and thus the type of the plan and the source of the original
contributions are unimportant by comparison.
Consistent with the recommendations relating to the premature
distribution penalty tax, 93 distributions before a certain age (such as
55) from any type of plan should be strictly limited. After that age,
distributions from any type of plan should be available, regardless of
whether the participant has terminated employment with the plan
sponsor,if the plan so provides.
Modifications to the distribution rules should also reflect the fact
that, in an attempt to retain the hard-to-replace skills of older
workers, many employers have begun to view retirement as a gradual
continuum, during which the employee gradually reduces his or her
work time, rather than as a single fixed event. A 1999 Watson Wyatt
survey of 586 large employers found that about 16% have formal
phased retirement programs, and another 28% are interested in
implementing one in the next few years. 94
Among public sector employers, deferred retirement option plans
193. See section HI.1, supra.
194. Phased Retirement: Reshaping the End of Work, available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/search/publications.asp?Component=Insider&ArticleI
D=8376&nm=Watson%20Wyatt (last visited July 6, 2002). See also ERISA
Advisory Council, Working Group Report on Phased Retirement, Nov. 14, 2000,
available at http://www.dol.gov/pwba/adcoun/phasedrl.htm (last visited July 6,
2002) (discussing the structure of phased retirement plans and the ERISA
Advisory Council's recommendations to the Secretary of the DOL).
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(DROPs) have become popular. Under the most common version of
this option, pension payments commence and are credited to an
individual account within the same plan while the employee continues
working. After a specified number of years, typically five, the
employee retires and receives the monthly pension and the
accumulated value (including earnings) of the account, which is
generally paid in a lump sum.195
The value of a participant's pension under a traditional plan will
generally decrease, often by a substantial amount, if the participant
continues to work after normal retirement age or, if the early
retirement benefit is subsidized, after early retirement age. Thus,
even employees who do not really want to retire may decide that it
would be foolish not to do so. Encouraging employees to work longer
may be good for the employer, by keeping in the work force
experienced employees who have skills that may not be easily
replaced. It is also good for the Social Security system, as the
continued employment means that Social Security tax will continue to
be paid on the worker's behalf and, at least as long as the worker is
under age 65, payment of Social Security benefits will be deferred:
I believe [President Bush's Social Security] Commission should
redefine retirement age policy by setting an earliest retirement age
and increasing it gradually so that the system stays within
budgetary balance taking into account such factors as growth in life
expectancy and.. .changes in other demographic factors such as
fertility rates. (A reduction in the growth rate of expected lifetime
benefits can also be part of this balancing act, but retirement age
adjustments require less net benefit reduction because they produce
more tax revenue). There should be no "normal retirement age."
Instead, there should be a systematic actuarial adjustment in
benefits for those who work any period beyond the earliest
retirement age. 19
In July, 2000, Rep. Pomeroy and Sen. Grassley introduced the
Phased Retirement Liberalization Act, which would have allowed
pension payments to be made during employment after the earliest of
normal retirement age, age 59 , or 30 years of service. This should
be revisited, with a view towards moving away from the idea of
retirement as a single life-changing event - full-time worker one day,
totally retired the next day - to the idea of retirement as a
continuum, where the worker reduces his or her hours gradually 19and
7
has the option of receiving gradually increasing pension payments.
195. Id. See generally TERRY A.M. MUMFORD & MARY BETH BRAITMAN, Deferred

Retirement Option Programs ('DROPs"), ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS,
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT AND WELFARE PLANS OF TAx-EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENTAL
EMPLOYERS, (Course No. SE04, September, 1999); Amy L. Cavanaugh, A Closer

Look at DROP Plans, 8 J. PENSION BENEFITS 34 (2001).
196. C. Eugene Steuerle, Major Issues in Social Security Reform. Statement
Before the President'sCommission to Strengthen Social Security, October 18, 2001.
197. As Adrien LaBombarde described it:
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On June 14, 2002, the IRS and the Treasury Department
requested comments on phased retirement arrangements under
defined benefit plans, and cited several specific issues on which
comments were requested. 198 The Notice stated that:
[als people are living longer, healthier lives, it is important to
reduce the risk of individuals outliving their retirement savings.
Phased retirement can provide employees additional time to save for
retirement because employees continue working (while they are
healthier and thus able to do so) and can accrue additional benefits
and reduce or forgo early spending of their retirement savings.
However, phased retirement can also increase the risk of outliving
retirement savings for employees who begin drawing upon their
retirement savings before normal retirement age. Even though the
annuity distribution options offered by defined benefit plans
preclude outliving benefits, early distribution of a portion of the
participant's benefit will reduce the benefits available after normal
retirement age.' 99
J. Annuity Rules
A defined benefit or money purchase plan is always subject to the
qualified joint and survivor annuity ("QJSA"), and qualified preretirement survivor annuity ("QPSA") rules.
A profit-sharing plan,
stock bonus plan or ESOP can escape these rules if the participant's
spouse receives 100% of the account balance on the participant's
death, or consents to another beneficiary.2
The annuity rules do not apply to any IRA (including an
employer-sponsored IRA) and a married IRA owner is not required to
name his or her spouse as beneficiary of 100% of the account balance
on the owner's death, or to obtain the spouse's consent to another
beneficiary.
Any plan that is required to offer the QJSA and QPSA is also
required to give the participant a written explanation of the annuity
option, including the terms and conditions of the annuity, the
From the perspective of benefits adequacy planning, the level of benefit
should be coordinated with the reduced income from partial service with
the employer, so that the combined amounts represent a consistent
transition between the income during full active service and the
retirement income anticipated during full retirement. Full planning of
the transition should take all relevant factors into account, including
eligibility for active employee benefits, retiree welfare benefits, receipt
of Social Security benefits, and the individual's changing needs during
the transition.
Adrien R. LaBombarde, Can Phased Retirement Really Work? Milliman &

Robertson Benefits Perspectives Update, May 2001 at 1; available at
http://www.milliman.com/files/PUp-0501-arl-phased.pdf (last visited July 6, 2002).
198. IRS Notice 2002-43, 2002-27 I.R.B. 1.
199. Id.
200. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(11) and 417 (2000), ERISA § 205 (2000).
201. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11)(B)(iii) (2000); ERISA § 205(b)(1)(C) (2000).
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participant's right to make, and the effect of, an election to waive the
annuity, the spousal consent rules, and the participant's right to
make, and the effect of, a revocation of an election to waive the
202
annuity.
There must be some spouses who receive a benefit because of the
rules, and who would not receive any benefit otherwise. However,
experience and the available evidence suggest that they are very few
in number, and that this result simply does not justify the enormous
expense and complexity that the rules create: "[sleveral empirical
studies show that, unless their property is large enough to entail tax
planning, spouses overwhelmingly strain to leave everything to the
20 3
surviving spouse, commonly disinheriting children in the process."
All defined contribution pension plans should be allowed to avoid
being subject to the QJSA and QPSA rules by complying with the
conditions applicable to profit sharing and stock bonus plans. In
addition, these rules should be extended to IRAs.
The annuity rules are very difficult and costly for plan sponsors.
In addition, it is almost impossible, in many cases, to explain
effectively to employees what their choices are, and for plan
participants and their spouses to decide, with any confidence, what
form of distribution is best for them. 20 4 Almost all defined contribution
plans, and many defined benefit plans, allow participants to choose a
lump sum distribution, and the survey evidence shows clearly that,
where a lump sum is available, only a very small percentage of plan
participants will choose to receive an annuity.
Universally, the anecdotal information indicates that less than one
percent of the participants in defined contribution plans with lump sum
payments take annuity forms of payment. In some cases, clients can't
remember a single participant who has taken an annuity in the last ten
years. In defined benefit plans that offer lump sum payments, the
number of participants who take annuities is also insignificant - again
less than one percent ....

Anecdotally, it is perceived that perhaps as

many as one to three percent of the retirement age participants take an
202. The prevailing view is that a premarital waiver of the QJSA (for example, a
prenuptial agreement) is void (see, e.g., Hurwitz v Sher, 982 F.2d 778, 782 (2nd Cir.
1992) (citing Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-20 (2000), Q & A 28 as support for the lower
court's holding that a premarital waiver does not satisfy the consent requirements
of 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(11) and 417 (2000)). However, one state appellate court has
held that a premarital waiver is valid. In re Estate of Hopkins, 574 N.E.2d 230,
235-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
203. Langbein & Wolk, supra note 28 at 584 (citing empirical literature collected
in Uniform Probate Code § 2-102, Comment (1993 revision)).
204. "For one employer, with a DB-DC floor offset arrangement, the forms are 39
pages: only one participant out of several hundred in the last 5 years did not elect a
lump sum from both plans." American Bar Association, Section of Taxation,
Employee Benefits Committee: Comments Regarding the Internal Revenue Service
and Treasury Department Proposal on Application of Section 411(d)(6) to Defined
Contribution Plans (1999) (the "ABA Report") at 16; 1999 TNT 109-15, June 8,
1999.
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annuity form of payment - if that many.

609

205

It is not always clear whether a 403(b) plan is subject to the
annuity rules. If the plan is exempt from ERISA, as a governmental
plan or church plan,2 °6 or pursuant to the regulatory exemption for
employee-funded plans,2 7 then the statutory annuity requirements do
not apply. Also if, as is relatively rare, the 403(b) plan document
specifies that the plan is a profit-sharing plan rather than a pension
plan, the plan can escape the rules if the participant's spouse receives
100% of the account balance on the participant's death, or consents to
another beneficiary.208 However, even if the plan is not subject to the
annuity rules, many 403(b) plan documents, particularly those drafted
by insurance companies, provide for annuities anyway.
As a first step, the law should be changed so that defined
contribution pension plans can avoid being subject to the QJSA and

QPSA rules by complying with the conditions applicable to profitsharing and stock bonus plans. The spouse would still be protected by
the requirement that he or she must be the beneficiary of 100% of the
participant's benefits under the plan, unless he or she consents to
another beneficiary being named.
In addition, it is anomalous, given the increasing utilization of
rollover IRAs, that spouses are protected with respect to benefits
under qualified plans and 403(b) plans, but have no protection under
a SEP or SIMPLE IRA, or once benefits are rolled over to an IRA.
Surely the nature and extent of spousal protection should be the
same, regardless of the type of retirement arrangement involved.
Accordingly, though it does not further simplification, IRAs should be
subject to the same (modified) rules as apply to defined contribution
plans.
We now have 17 years of experience with the ERISA annuity
rules, as modified by the REA. Surely, it should now be possible to
simplify the rules. One helpful move would be for the IRS to issue
model safe harbor language for the annuity explanation, as it did in
1997 for spousal waivers of the QJSA or QPSA.2 °9
K. Taxation of Distributions

In general, distributions from retirement plans are subject to
taxation as ordinary income, except to the extent that they represent
a return of basis. 210 However, if the plan distributes employer
205. Id. at 10.
206. ERISA § 4(b)(1), (2) (2000).
207. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(f) (2000).
208. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(C) (2000).
209. See generally I.R.S. Notice 97-10, 1997-1 C.B. 370 (containing sample
language for a spouse's waiver to a QJSA or QPSA).

210. 26 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 403(b)(1), and 457(a)(1) (2000). The constructive receipt
rule generally does not apply to tax-favored retirement arrangements, so the fact
that the funds could have been distributed sooner is not relevant. However, the

[35:565

The John MarshallLaw Review

securities,

there

appreciation."2 1 '

are

special

rules

for

the

"net

unrealized

Also, in the case of a participant born before 1936,

certain lump sum distributions from qualified plans qualify for
favorable averaging or capital gains treatment. 212
Most distributions before age 59 are subject to a 10% additional
income tax. 13 This tax applies to 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans and IRAs
(including SEPS and SIMPLE IRAs). The tax does not apply to 457
plans of private tax-exempt employers, but does apply to distributions
from a governmental 457 plan, to the extent that they are attributable
to rollovers to the plan from another type of plan. 14
The special rules granting favorable tax treatment of lump sum
distributions and net unrealized appreciation on employer securities
should be repealed. The original premise for favorable tax treatment
of lump sum distributions and net unrealized appreciation on
employer securities was to avoid bunching of income. That premise
has not been valid since rollovers were introduced in 1974. These
special rules have no continuing justification and should be repealed
completely.
L. Rollovers
Effective for distributions made after 2001, EGTRRA has greatly
simplified and rationalized the rollover rules. In general, any "eligible
rollover distribution" (including after-tax contributions)2 15 from any
constructive receipt rule does apply to 457 plans maintained by private tax-exempt
employers. 26 U.S.C. § 457(a)(1)(B) (2000).
211. 26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4) (2000).
212. Tax Reform Act of 1986 §§ 1122(h)(3)-(6), as amended by the Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 §§ 1011A(b)(13), (15) (1988). If the taxpayer
receives a "qualified distribution" from a Roth IRA, the distribution is not taxable.
See 26 U.S.C. § 408A(d)(2)(A) (2000) (defining "qualified distribution"). See also 26
U.S.C. § 408A(d)(1) (2000) (excluding qualified distribution from a Roth IRA from
gross income). Also, if a death benefit consists of or includes life insurance
proceeds, then the at-risk portion of the insurance proceeds (total proceeds minus
the cash surrender value of the policy immediately before the participant's death) is
not taxable. 26 U.S.C. § 72(m)(3) (2000).
213. 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
214. 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(9) (2000).
215. 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(4) (2000). Any distribution from a qualified plan is an
eligible rollover distribution, except: (1) a "distribution which is one of a series of
substantially equal periodic payments (not less frequently than annually) made:
[(a)] for the life (or life expectancy) of the employee or the joint lives (or joint life
expectancies) of the employee and the employee's designated beneficiary, or [(b)] for
a fixed period of 10 years or more." 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(4)(A) (2000). See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.402(c)-2 (2000) (amplifying 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(4)(A) (2000) in question and
answer 5 and 6); (2) a required minimum distribution (RMD) under 26 U.S.C. §
401(a)(9) (2000); 26 U.S.C § 402(c)(4)(B) (2000) see also Treas. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2
(2000) (discussing § 402(c)(4)(B) in question and answer 7); and (3) a hardship
distribution (some hardship distributions made before January 1, 2000, were
eligible rollover distributions) 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(4)(C) (2000). According to Notice
2000-3, 2000-2 I.R.B. 289, a distribution from a governmental 457 plan on account
of an unforeseeable emergency cannot be rolled over. Under the regulations, the
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retirement plan (including a governmental 457 plan but not a private
sector 457 plan) may be rolled over to any other such plan, by the
participant or owner or by a beneficiary who is the surviving spouse of
the participant or owner, or by an alternate payee under a qualified
domestic relations order (QDRO) who is the spouse or former spouse
of the participant.i 6
Unless the distribution is directly rolled over, an eligible rollover17
distribution is subject to mandatory 20% income tax withholding;
this does not apply to distributions from an IRA.2 '8 Distributions from
a private sector 457 plan are not eligible for rollover, and thus are not
subject to mandatory withholding, but a direct transfer may be made
from one 457 plan to another. 9
If the distribution is made in property other than cash, then the
amount so transferred must be the property distributed. 220
Alternatively, part or all of the proceeds from the sale of the property
may be rolled over. To the extent that the proceeds are rolled over, no
gain or loss will be recognized on the sale.22' There must be an actual
sale: if, instead of selling the property received in the distribution, the
individual simply contributes cash equal to the fair market value of
the property, the cash contribution is not a valid rollover
contribution. 2 The rule allowing property distributed by a qualified
plan or 403(b) arrangement to be sold, and the proceeds of sale rolled
over, does not apply to a distribution from an IRA.222
following are also not eligible rollover distributions: (1) corrective distributions of
elective deferrals and income, to cure a 26 U.S.C. § 415 violation; (2) corrective
distributions of excess deferrals and income, to cure a violation of the annual dollar
limitation on elective deferrals (26 U.S.C. 88 401(a)(30) and 402(g) (2000)); (3)
corrective distributions of excess contributions and income or excess aggregate
contributions and income, to cure a failure of the ADP test or ACP test; (4) loans
that are treated as deemed distributions pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 72(p) (2000) (by
contrast, a loan offset amount may be an eligible rollover distribution) (see Treas.
Reg. § 1.402(c)-2 (2000) (discussing plan loan offset amount in question and answer
9) and I.R.S. Notice 93-3, 1993-1 C.B. 293); (5) dividends paid on employer
securities held by an ESOP, as described in 26 U.S.C. § 404(k) (2000); and (6) the
taxable cost of life insurance protection under a qualified plan (the P.S. 58 costs).
216. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(8) (2000); 26
U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(A), (D) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 457(e)(16)(B) (2000) (regulating
rollover amounts).
217. 26 U.S.C. § 3405(c)(1)(B) (2000).
218. The direct rollover requirement applies to qualified plans, and section 403(b)
arrangements, but does not apply to IRAs. For distributions made on or after
January 1, 2000, the direct rollover requirement also applies to governmental 457
plans. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(31)(A) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(10) (2000); 26 U.S.C. §
457 (d)(1)(C) (2000).
219. 26 U.S.C. § 457(e)(10) (2000).
220. 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) (2000).
221. 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(6) (2000).
222. 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) (2000). See also Rev. Rul. 87-77, 1987-2 C.B. 115
(holding that there must be a "bona fide" sale of property in order for the cash to be
a valid rollover contribution).
223. 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(A)(i) (2000).
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In general, unless there is a direct rollover, the rollover must be
224
However, EGTRRA has given the IRS
effected within 60 days.
discretionary authority to extend this time limit where it would be
equitable to do so.225
The IRS recently ruled that a direct rollover from a qualified
plan to an IRA could not be completed after the participant's death,
even though he had done everything required of him to effect the
rollover, and the funds were within two days of being transferred
when he died. The ruling stated that:
[allthough not explicitly stated in either Code section 402(c), Code
section 401(a)(31), or the regulations promulgated thereunder, a valid
rollover, even if intended to be accomplished as a direct transfer as that
term is defined in Code section 401(a)(31), necessitates the actual
transfer of plan assets occur during the lifetime of the employee for
whose benefit
account is maintained and for whose benefit the
•
• the plan
226
IRA is established.
By contrast, where the distribution from the plan was received before
the participant's death, the decedent's personal representative has
been allowed to effect a rollover." 7
The effect of the IRS ruling was to considerably shorten the
period over which the plan benefits could be distributed, and thus to
eliminate tax deferral opportunities that otherwise would have been
224. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(3) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(A), (D)
(2000); 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(A) (2000) (requiring rollover be made within 60 days).
The period runs from the date of actual receipt, not the date on which the check is
issued or mailed. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7950031 (Sept. 12, 1979). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8833043 (May 26, 1988) (holding that time period for rollovers ends 60 days from
date of receipt). If more than one distribution is received, the 60-day rule applies
separately to each distribution. See Treas. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2 (2000) (stating in
question and answer 11 that if an employee receives more than one distribution,
"the 60-day rule applies separately to each distribution").
225. For distributions made on or after January 1, 2002, the Secretary may waive
the 60-day requirement where the failure to do so "would be against equity or good
conscience, including casualty, disaster, or other events beyond the reasonable
control of the individual." 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(3)(B) (2000). See also 26 U.S.C. §
403(b)(8)(B) (2000) (announcing the same rule with respect to 403(b)
arrangements); 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(I) (2000) (announcing the same rule with
respect to IRAs). As before, there are special rules for "frozen deposits" which may
not be withdrawn because of the bankruptcy or insolvency of a financial institution.
See 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(7) (2000) (announcing the rule with respect to qualified
plans). See also 26 U.S.C. § 403(b)(8)(B) (2000) (announcing the rule with respect
to 403(b) arrangements); 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(F) (2000) (announcing the rule with
respect to IRAs). As under prior law, IRS also has authority to waive the 60-day
limit for hardships that result from a presidentially-declared disaster or military
service in a combat zone. See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.7508-1(a) (2000); Treas.
Reg. § 301.7508-1A-1(a) (2000) (providing deadline extensions for service in combat
zone and presidentially declared disasters).
226. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200004038 (Oct. 30, 2001).
227. Gunther v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 126, 127 (W.D. Mich. 1982); see also
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8351119 (Sept. 23, 1983) (allowing rollover where distribution was
received before decedent's death).
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available to the beneficiaries.
The following additional simplifications should be made:
1.

Allow rollovers of any actual distributions (including annuity
payments, but excluding corrective distributions and required
minimum distributions).

2.

Eliminate the one rollover per year rule for IRAs
and the rule
that does not permit the cash equivalent of distributed property to
229
be rolled over, so that, if a qualified plan distributes property that
cannot be held by an IRA (such as S corporation stock, life
insurance or a collectible), the property need not be sold in order to
effect a rollover.

3.

Allow rollovers to be completed by the personal representative of a
deceased plan participant or IRA owner, if the rollover
requirements are otherwise met.

228

In recent years, increased attention has been paid to the
importance of keeping assets in the retirement system, rather than
having
distributions
be
used
for
current
consumption.
Recommendation 1 furthers this objective. Recommendations 2 and 3
deal with rules that serve no useful purpose and may impede the
portability of retirement plan assets.
M. Plans That Hold Employer Securities30
The complexity of the rules relating to employer securities is
exacerbated by the fact that different sets of rules apply to different
groups of plans. First, there are rules applicable only to ESOPs, as
defined in Code section 4975(e)(7). These rules include: a special
deduction limit for leveraged ESOPs; 231 non-recognition of capital gain
on certain sales to an ESOP; 232 excise taxes on early disposition of, and
for violating the non-allocation rules under Code section 409(n)
relating to, stock acquired by the ESOP in a transaction subject to

228. 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(B) (2000).
229. 26 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C), (c)(6) (2000).
230. Joint Committee on Taxation Background Information on Investment of
Retirement Plan Assets in Employer Stock, BNA Pension & Benefits Reporter, Feb.
19, 2000, at 636. See also Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Employer
Sponsored Defined Contribution Plans and Other Retirement Arrangements for
Senate Finance Committee Hearing, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Feb. 27, 2000, at

39-DTR L-1 (discussing generally employer sponsored defined contribution plans);
AMERICAN BENEFITS COUNCIL, Summary and Comparison of Select Retirement

Legislative
Proposals
(May
6,
2002),
available
at
http://
www.americanbenefitscouncil.com/documents/chartABC-050602.PDF (last visited
July 11, 2002) (summarizing several legislative proposals concerning limitations on
acquiring or holding employer stock).
231. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(9) (2000).
232. 26 U.S.C. § 1042 (2000) (deferring recognition of gain on certain sales of
stock to employee stock ownership plans).
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section 1042; 2 3 an exemption from the excise tax on reversions, for
assets transferred to an ESOP between April 1, 1985 and December
31, 1988;234 and a 50% exclusion from gross income for interest
received on an ESOP loan, and the related exemption from the belowmarket-interest loan rules.2 5
Second, there are rules that apply both to section 4975(e)(7)
ESOPs and to tax credit ESOPs: an exemption from the joint and
survivor annuity requirements; 236 a diversification requirement;
a
rule requiring that all valuations of employer securities which are not
readily tradable on an established securities market, with respect to
activities carried on by the plan, must be performed by an
independent appraiser; 28 a deduction for certain dividends paid on
employer securities held by the ESOP; 239 and an exemption from
certain requirements of the
anti-cutback rule.20 Certain rules apply
241
ESOPs.
credit
tax
only to
Finally, there are rules that must be satisfied by any section
4975(e)(7) ESOP or tax credit ESOP, and also by the other types of
plan specified in the particular provision: voting rights with respect
to employer securities;242 the right to receive benefits in the form of
employer securities; 243 the requirement of a put option with respect to
unmarketable securities; 244 the accelerated distribution rules; and the
requirements for payment of the price when the employer honors the
245
put option.
The need for the retention of each of these rules should be
evaluated in the light of experience since the rule was enacted. The
233. 26 U.S.C. § 409(n) (2000); see also 26 U.S.C. § 4978 (2000) (imposing an
excise tax on dispositions by employee stock ownership plans and cooperatives); 26
U.S.C. § 4979A (2000) (imposing an excise tax on prohibited allocations of qualified
securities).
234. 26 U.S.C. § 4980(c)(3) (2000).
235. 26 U.S.C. § 133 (repealed 1996); 26 U.S.C. § 7872(f)(11) (2000) (these rules
now apply only to loans made before August 21, 1996 and certain refinancings of
such loans).
236. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11)(C) (2000).
237. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(28)(B) (2000).
238. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(28)(C) (2000).
239. 26 U.S.C. § 404(k) (2000).
240. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6)(C) (2000). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(3) (2000)
(providing an exception for certain employee stock ownership plans); Treas. Reg. §
1.411(d) (2000)-4, Q & A 2(b)(2)(iv), 2(d).
241. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(6)(D) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 409(b), (c), (d), (f),
(i), (j), (in) (2000) (applying rules on tax credit ESOPs).
242. 26 U.S.C. § 409(e) (2000). See also 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(22) (2000) (defining
when § 409(e) applies).
243. 26 U.S.C. § 409(h) (2000). See also 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(23) (2000) (providing
that stock bonus plans are subject to the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 409(h) (2000)).
244. 26 U.S.C. § 409(h) See also Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(10), (12) (2000)
(discussing "put options" for unmarketable securities).
245. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(23) (2000). See also 26 U.S.C. § 409(h)(5)-(6) (2000)
(providing requirements for employer repurchase of securities); 26 U.S.C. § 409(o)
(2000) (discussing further distribution requirements).
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retained rules should apply to all qualified plans holding employer
securities. These special rules relating to employer securities were
enacted to protect plan participants. The need for protection appears
to be the same, regardless of what type of plan holds the securities.
Some rules should, perhaps, be repealed; others should be modified.
The retained rules should apply to all plans holding employer
securities, unless a good reason can be shown for departing from this
principle of uniformity.
The Enron debacle has led to demands for new rules relating to
investments by retirement plans in employer securities. Numerous
bills have been introduced, and on April 11, 2002, the House of
Representatives passed HR 3762, the Pension Security Act of 2002.46
Various professional groups have provided summaries of the various
pending pension bills247
N. EmployerAggregation
In determining whether retirement plans and other employee
benefits qualify for tax-favored treatment under the Code, the
employer aggregation rules generally require related employers to be
These employer aggregation rules
treated as a single employer.2"
apply to all types of qualified plans and also to SIMPLE IRAs, but do
not apply to 457 plans. Also, the Code does not list section 403(b)
among the sections to which the aggregation rules apply.
The employer aggregation rules generally require a specified
degree of common ownership in order for aggregation to apply.
Accordingly, they appear not to apply to governmental employers, taxexempt organizations, or other entities that do not have owners.
However, on occasion, the IRS has taken the position that such
The IRS has requested
entities are subject to aggregation.24 9
comments on this issue and, pending the issuance of further guidance,
25
The argument for
a good faith compliance standard is in effect.
applying the aggregation rules to 403(b) plans, as opposed to qualified
plans of governmental and tax-exempt employers, is even weaker,
because the Code does not list section 403(b) among the sections to
which the aggregation rules apply. 1

246. See generally Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Summary of HR
3762, The Pension Security Act of 2002, As Passed by the House of Representatives
on April 11, 2002 (Apr. 12, 2002), available at http://www.psca.org/wash/
hr3762.html (last visited July 7, 2002) (summarizing HR 3762).
at
230,
note
supra
Council,
Benefits
American
247. See
www.americanbenefitscouncil.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002) (providing an
example of a listing of legislative proposals).
248. See 26 U.S.C. § 414(b)-(c), (m)(1) (2000) (providing related employers must
be treated as a single employer).
249. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8706023 (Nov. 7, 1986). See also I.R.S. Notice 89-23, 1989-1
C.B. 654 (providing safe harbors for discrimination rules).
250. I.R.S. Notice 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 229.
251. See 26 U.S.C. § 414(m)(4), (t) (2000) (failing to list Section 403(b)).
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The employer aggregation rules are of fundamental importance,
particularly in testing plans for compliance with the minimum
coverage rules, the nondiscrimination rules, and the section 415
limitations.
Accordingly, guidance on their application to
organizations that do not have owners is essential.
The affiliated service group and leased employee rules 2 2 were
enacted in the early 1980s to address specific and relatively narrow
abuses. Both provisions are far broader than is required to deal with
the abuse, and guidance is sparse. A detailed review of these rules by
Congress is long overdue.
In 1986, Congress enacted the separate line of business (SLOB)
253
rules
to provide relief for organizations that, while connected by
common ownership, were in fact separate. The regulations add highly
detailed and restrictive requirements that make the SLOB rules
available to only very few employers.254 Congress should instruct the
IRS to issue new, more workable regulations.
0.

The Pre-TerminationBenefit Restrictions

As under pre-ERISA rulings, which limited the benefits that
could be paid to any of the 25 highest paid employees prior to plan
termination, there are special limits on the amount that can be
distributed by a defined benefit plan to certain highly compensated
employees.
In certain cases, a larger amount can be distributed if
the employee provides collateral to the plan. However, the employer
may be forced to terminate the plan in order to be able to pay a lump
sum to a highly compensated employee, as the collateralization
exception may be impracticable2 6 if, for instance, the present value of
the total benefit is less than 125% of the restricted amount.257
These benefit restrictions should be repealed, or their application
limited to defined benefit plans that are subject to Code section
401(a)(4), but are not covered by the PBGC insurance program, such
as plans• • of258professional service employers with fewer than 26
participants.
As a result of the enactment of Title IV of ERISA, and
its amendment by the Single Employer Pension Plans Amendment
Act of 1980, the ability of an employer to terminate a defined benefit
plan has been severely restricted. In addition, the types of employers
252. 26 U.S.C. § 414(m)-(n) (2000).
253. 26 U.S.C. § 414(r) (2000).
254. See Treas. Reg. § 1.414(r)-(1)-(11) (2000) (providing special SLOB rules).
255. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-5 (2000) (providing examples of how the
regulation limits distribution of benefits to highly compensated employees); see also
Rev. Rul. 92-76, 1992-2 C.B. 76 (analyzing Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)(4)-5).
256. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-5 (2000). See also Rev. Rul. 92-76, 1992-2 C.B.
76 (analyzing Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-5).
257. Pamela D. Perdue, Going, Going, Gone: The Continuing Decline of the
TraditionalDefined Benefit Plan, 26 J. PENSION PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE 1, 1112 (2001).
258. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(13) (2000).
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to which the rule was directed have largely abandoned defined benefit

plans.
The IRS should also issue guidance clarifying that, in situations
where the benefit restrictions do apply, it is permissible for:

(1) the

lump sum present value of the employee's accrued benefit to be
transferred

to a

separate account for that employee, within the

defined benefit plan; 259 and (2) that account to be credited, at least
annually, with its proportionate share of the plan's actual investment

earnings.
P.

Cash Balance Plans

Under ERISA and the Code, a defined benefit plan is any plan
under which the benefit is not determined solely by reference to the
value of the participant's account. 26 0 This covers a very wide range of

possible plan designs, including hybrid plan designs such as cash
balance plans. Much of the litigation and other troubles resulting from
the increased use of cash balance plans have a very simple cause basic ERISA concepts, like the "accrued benefit"2 l and anti-

backloading rules,262 work adequately for traditional defined benefit
plans, but fail miserably when confronted with cash balance plans. As
the ERISA Advisory Council noticed:
Technical provisions in current law that were specifically designed for
annuity-based defined benefit plans should be examined carefully and,
to the extent that it is demonstrated that they inhibit plan provisions
that would provide equitable, broad-based retirement income through
account-based defined benefit plans, revised as they apply to such
262
plans.

Congress should direct the Treasury Department and the IRS to
review existing statutory and regulatory provisions governing the

design and operation of defined benefit plans, and determine whether
and how they should be modified to accommodate non-traditional

defined benefit plan designs.2
259. 26 U.S.C. § 414(k) (2000).
260. 26 U.S.C. § 414(j) (2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2000) (defining
"defined benefit plan").
261. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7) (2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (2000) (defining
.accrued benefit").
262. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) (2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2000) (providing
for benefit accrual requirements).
263. ERISA Advisory Council, Report/Recommendations of the Working Group
Studying the Trend in the Defined Benefit Market to Hybrid Plans (Nov. 10, 1999)
available at www.dol.gov.pwba/regs/fedreg/meetings/99012380.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2002).
264. See Hybrid Pension Plan Coverage: Retirement Into the 21st Century:
Hearing of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pension Committee, 107th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Senior Pension Fellow, American
Academy of Actuaries). Gebbhardtsbauer stated:
[O]ne remedy for [whipsaw] would be for Congress to clarify that if the
promise is an account balance with a yield that can be achieved in the
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Cash balance plan sponsors have lost three recent cases
concerning permissible interest rates to be used in calculating preretirement lump sum distributions." 5 Also, a recent report issued by
the Department of Labor's Inspector General asserted widespread
benefit underpayments:
Our analysis of the 60 converted cash balance plans found that the
conversions adequately protected benefits from earlier plans.
However, in 13 of those 60 plans, we found that workers who left
employment before normal retirement age did not receive all the
accrued benefits to which they were legally entitled; being
underpaid an estimated $17 million each year. Applying the same
estimation model used in our judgmental sample to the estimated
300 to 700 defined benefit plans that have converted to cash balance
plans, we estimate that workers 2 may
be underpaid between $85
66
million and $199 million annually.
The report recommended that the DOL should strengthen
oversight of cash balance plans by:
1. Directing more enforcement resources to protecting cash balance
plans' participant benefits.
2.

Initiating specific enforcement action on the 13 plans with
forfeitures identified in this audit.

3. Working with the IRS to develop improved guidance for plan
administrators in calculating participant accrued benefits. 267
The report acknowledged that PWBA disagreed with the report's
methodology and questioned its conclusions, and "stated that without
a broader survey of the problem and more detailed information it
markets, then the lump sum could be the amount of the account
balance. In addition, some employers subsidize (or would like to
subsidize) the annuity purchase rate to encourage participants to select
annuities. One important question for Congress is whether this subsidy
should be reflected in the lump sum. If it is, then it would discourage
employers from subsidizing annuities - something Congress should
want.
Id.
265. Berger v. Xerox Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 998 (S.D. Ill. 2001); Esden v. Bank of
Boston, 229 F.3d 154 (2nd Cir. 2000); Lyons v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 221 F.3d 1235
(11th Cir. 2000); see also Alvin D. Lurie, Whipsawed and Up the Creek Without a
Respected Determination Letter, 59 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7.03 (2001); Cash Balance Cavalcade:
Part I, ERISA LIT. REP., Dec. 2000, at 28; Benefit Accrual Rules 411(a)(11) ADEA,
ERISA LIT. REP., Feb. 2001, at 15; Douglas E. Motzenbecker, Recent Case Law

Developments Affecting Cash Balance Pension Plans, 17 THE LABOR LAW 285, 28592 (Fall 2001) (discussing generally the holdings in the three cases).
266. The U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, PWBA

Needs to Improve Oversight of Cash Balance Lump Sum Distributions (March 29,
2002), available at www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2000/09-02-001-12-121.pdf
(last visited Sept. 6 2002).
267. Id.
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could not commit to redirecting enforcement resources to cash balance
plan benefit calculations."26
In testimony given in September, 1999,269 Stuart Brown, then
Chief Counsel of the IRS, made it clear that the IRS does not think
that cash balance plans are inherently bad, but identified three areas
of particular concern in connection with cash balance conversions:
rate of accrual issues;270 protection of accrued benefits; 27' and age
discrimination.272
Since 1999, the IRS, the DOL, and the EEOC have been
reviewing the age discrimination issues relating to cash balance
conversions: surely it is now time for them to publish their
conclusions. In general, under federal employment discrimination
laws, there are two types of discrimination claims: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.272 The claim that cash balance plans
discriminate is a disparate impact claim because it relies solely on the
effect of the plan design. Before the Supreme Court's 1993 Hazen
Paper decision, most people assumed that the ADEA permitted
disparate impact claims. However, the Court questioned whether the
disparate impact theory is available under the ADEA, and recent
cases support the view that such a claim is not available.2 74
Q. Interest Rates for Defined Benefit Plans
For purposes of determining the plan's current liability and for
determining the deficit reduction contribution under Code section
412(1) (additional funding requirements for under-funded single
employer plans), the interest rate must be within the permissible
268. Id.
269. See supra note 265 (quoting Stuart Brown).
270. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2000) (establishing accrued benefit
requirements).
271. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6) (2000).
272. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(H), (d)(2)(A) (2000). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)
(2000) (prohibiting the cessation or reduction of benefit accruals on account of age);
29 U.S.C. § 623(i) (2000) (prohibiting age discrimination with respect to employee
pension benefit plans).
273. As explained by the Supreme Court:
'Disparate treatment'. . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion or other protected
characteristics. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment .... Claims that stress "disparate impact" by contrast involve
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that fall more harshly on one group than another
and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory

motive... is not required under a disparate-impact theory.
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (quoting Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977)).
274. See also Eaton v Onan Corporation, 117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(holding that a cash balance plan did not violate federal age discrimination laws).
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range. The permissible range is 90% to 110% (105% for the deficit
reduction contribution) of the weighted average of the rates of interest
on 30-year Treasury securities during the 4-year period ending on the
last day of the previous plan year.275 In March, 2002, Congress
enacted a short-term fix: in calculating the deficit reduction
contribution for the 2002 and 2003 plan years, the upper end of the
range has been increased from 105% to 120% of the 4-year weighted
276
average interest rate.
The 30-year Treasury interest rate must also be used to
determine the amount (if any) of the PBGC variable premium. The
interest rate to be used in determining a single employer plan's
variable rate premium is 85% of the annual yield on 30-year Treasury
securities for the month preceding the beginning of the plan year for
which premiums are paid.277 Again, Congress has granted relief for
plan years beginning in 2002 and 2003: the plan can use 100% of the
rate rather than 85%.278
In recent years, the mandated 30-year Treasury rate has been
both volatile and unduly low. Rates are likely to fall even lower
following the recent announcement that the Treasury Department
will no longer issue 30-year securities. 279 This problem should be
addressed promptly, by replacing the Treasury interest rate with a
more accurate rate, as it directly affects the financial soundness of
defined benefit plans. Also, by introducing uncertainty, because the
30-year Treasury rates are so volatile, it (1) makes it considerably
more difficult to fund defined benefit plans correctly and (2) makes
defined benefit plans even less attractive to small businesses.
The sponsor of a defined benefit plan may need three different
funding calculations: one for determining the minimum funding
obligation under section 412; a second for determining whether it is
liable for variable PBGC premiums; and a third to calculate its
pension expense for financial accounting purposes under FAS 87.
This should not be necessary.
R. The PBGC Insurance Program
Under Title IV of ERISA, most defined benefit plans that are
275. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(5)(B) (2000) (providing that the Secretary may reduce
the lower end of the range from 90% to 80% if he finds that the lowest permissible
rate is unreasonably high.)
276. 26 U.S.C. § 412(l)(7)(C)(i)(III) (2000), added by § 405(a)(1) of the Job
Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2000 ("JCWAA").
277. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E)(iii)(II) (2000); PBGC Reg. 29 C.F.R. § 1306.4(b)(1)

(2000).
278. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E)(iii)(IV) (2000), added by § 405(c) of JCWAA (2000).
279. In March, 2002, IRS issued Notice 2002-26, which describes the
methodology for calculating the rate of interest on 30-year Treasury securities, for
purposes of 26 U.S.C. §§ 412 and 417 (2002). The rate was 5.71% for January, 2000,
5.70% for February, 2002 and 5.69% for March, 2002. In April, 2002, the IRS
announced that the rate for April, 2002, was 5.69%. Notice 2002-28.
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subject to ERISA are also subject to the PBGC termination insurance
program. 20 Accordingly, such a plan must pay annual premiums to
PBGC, the plan may only be terminated in accordance with Title IV,
and if the plan terminates with insufficient assets to pay all benefits,
the benefits are guaranteed (up to certain limits) by PBGC.2 1
In 1974, when ERISA was enacted, the annual PBGC premium
was $1 per participant. In 2002, the minimum annual premium is $19
per participant, and plans which are determined to be less wellfunded are required to pay an additional variable rate premium 2 .
"While a premium of $19 is frequently argued to be trivial,
compounded with interest over a working lifetime, 283
it may reduce the
average worker's pension by $600 to $700 per year."

In 2000, PBGC premium income was about $831 million.2 This
money, paid either by the employer or by the plan, could otherwise
have been used to provide benefits to plan participants. In the case of
the vast majority of covered plans, that are more than adequately
funded, this would have been far more beneficial for the participants
in those plans.
The expense of calculating and paying PBGC
premiums is another factor that places defined benefit plans at a
competitive disadvantage when compared to defined contribution
plans.
Compliance with the requirements of Title IV imposes a
significant financial and administrative burden on covered plans. In
addition, since the single employer termination program was last
revised significantly in 1980, economic conditions have changed
considerably and the number of defined benefit plans has dropped
precipitously.
The PBGC insurance program almost certainly
represents a barrier to adoption of new defined benefit plans,
particularly by small employers.
Congress should mandate a comprehensive, independent study of
the design and operation of the single employer termination program.
At a minimum, consideration should be given to exempting small
employers from PBGC coverage. This would make defined benefit
plans significantly more attractive to small employers.

280. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a) (plans covered) and (b) (2000) (plans not covered).
281. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322 (single employer plans), 1322A (2000) (multiemployer plans).
282. The PBGC single employer program had a deficit through 1994: at the
end of 1993, the deficit was $2,897 million, and it was $1,240 million at the
end of 1994. At the end of 1999, it had a $7,038 million surplus. PBGC Pension
InsuranceData Book, 1999, Table S-1.

283. Theodore R. Groom and John B. Shoven, How the Pension System
Should Be Reformed, September 8, 1999, prepared for the conference ERISA
AFTER 25 YEARS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING PENSION REFORM.

284. Pension Insurance Fact Sheet, available at www.pbgc.gov (last visited

Sept. 6, 2002).
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S. Coordinationof Agency Jurisdictionand Statutory Provisions
An employer that sponsors a retirement plan must deal with the
IRS, the DOL and the PBGC (for those who sponsor a qualified
defined benefit plan). The roles of the three federal agencies in
administering and enforcing the pension laws should be subject to a
comprehensive review. The purpose would be to coordinate the
activities of the three agencies in order to: (1) reduce the burden on
employers of dealing with the separate agencies and (2) harmonize the
objectives and enforcement priorities of the three agencies.
Federal pension law includes two main sets of rules: the rules
specifying when retirement arrangements qualify for tax-favored
treatment (the rules in the Code) and the rules conferring rights and
protections on plan participants (the rules in ERISA). Conceptually,
these rules are separate, and thus it is probably inevitable that they
will be contained in separate statutes.
Most of the substantive pension rules appear both in the Code
and ERISA. Generally, this is not a problem, although greater
consistency in section numbering would make life easier for the nonspecialist. However, there are discrepancies between the Code and
ERISA. Some of these were in the original statute (for instance,
different definitions of "employer securities" and "employee stock
ownership plan" and, in the prohibited transaction rules, differences
Some
between "parties in interest" and "disqualified persons").
discrepancies have resulted from subsequent statutes that amended
the Code but not ERISA. These discrepancies cause confusion, serve
no useful purpose, and should be eliminated. The pension provisions
of ERISA and the Code should be reviewed thoroughly, with a view to
ensuring that the provisions of the two statutes are consistent,
eliminating discrepancies and removing provisions that no longer
serve any useful purpose.
Several of the leading proponents of ERISA wanted to establish a
single federal agency, similar to the SEC, with jurisdiction over
pension plans. I suspect that, despite the advantages of a single
agency, political considerations will prevent its creation, as they did in
1974. If jurisdictional authority continues to be divided between
several agencies, then it is important that their activities be
consistent and coordinated, to reduce the regulatory burden on
pension sponsors to a minimum.
T. PresentValue Calculations
The 30-year Treasury interest rate must also be used in
and in calculating
calculating minimum lump-sum benefits,28
maximum benefits under Code section 415.2
Th[e] artificially low rate of interest on 30-year Treasuries relative to
285.

26 U.S.C. § 417(e)(3) (2000).

286. 26 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(E)(ii) (2000).
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both the rate of interest on long-term corporate bonds and the rate of
interest inherent in the pricing of insurance company annuity
contracts ....
also means that participants can draw substantially more
than the present economic value of their accrued benefit simply by
taking a lump-sum distribution rather than an annuity form of
payment.... With studies showing that most workers spend rather
than save their lump-sum distributions, policy makers should question
whether this incentive is good pension policy."7
According to the American Academy of Actuaries, the lump sum
for a 45-year-old can be 30% more than the amount needed to buy an
annuity (10% more for a 62-year-old).2 8
These unrealistically low interest assumptions are undesirable
for two reasons. First, they offer a financial incentive to participants
(to choose a lump sum rather than an annuity), which is not
consistent with good pension policy. Second, they drain plan assets by
requiring plans to pay more than the economic equivalent of the
accrued annuity benefit.
U. Accrued Benefit Issues Under the Anti-Cutback Rule
In the case of a defined benefit plan, the term "accrued benefit"
means:
1.

If the plan provides an accrued benefit in the form of an annual
benefit commencing at normal retirement age, that accrued benefit;
or

2.

Otherwise, an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age
which is the actuarial equivalent Sof the accrued benefit
determined under the plan.

In general, the term "accrued benefit" refers only to pension or
retirement benefits. Consequently, the accrued benefit does not
290
include ancillary benefits not directly related to retirement benefits.
The subsidized portion of an early retirement benefit may also be
disregarded in determining benefit accruals. 291 Benefits under a
defined benefit plan must accrue in accordance with one of the three
methods described in the statute: the 3% method; the 133 1/3 rule; or
the fractional rule.2 2 In general, these definitions are adequate, for

287. Groom Law Group, The Case for Dropping 30-Year Treasury Rates as
the Benchmark for Valuing Liabilities in Defined Benefit Pension Plans, at
www.groom.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
288. American Academy of Actuaries, Pension Practice Council, Public
Statement, The Impact of Inordinately Low 30-Year Treasury Rates on
Defined Benefit Plans, July 11, 2001.
289. Determined under 26 U.S.C. § 411(c)(3) (2000), 26 U.S.C. § 204(c)(3)
(2000) and Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-i (2000).
290. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(i) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 3(23)(A) (2000); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(23)(A) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(a)(1) (2000).
291. 26 U.S.C. § 204(b)(1)(H) (2000).
292. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2000), and 26 U.S.C. § 204(b)(1)(A)-(C)
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most purposes, in the case of a traditional defined benefit plan.
However, in cases asserting violations of the anti-cutback rule, courts
have struggled with what is included in the accrued benefit. In
addition, the concepts are woefully inadequate in the case of hybrid
plans, multi-formula plans and other nontraditional types of defined
benefit plan. The cases have been inconsistent in their holdings as to
what constitutes an accrued benefit for purposes of the anti-cutback
rule. 93 The IRS and the Treasury Department should consider issuing
additional regulations to address these issues.
Second, the statute provides for the term "retirement-type
subsidy" to be defined in regulations, but the regulations do not do so.
The Committee report on REA states that
[t]he bill provides that the term "retirement-type subsidy" is to be
defined by Treasury regulations. The committee intends that under
these regulations, a subsidy that continues after retirement is generally
to be considered a retirement-type subsidy. The committee expects,
however, that a qualified disability benefit, a medical benefit, a social
security supplement, a death benefit (including life insurance), or a
plant shutdown benefit (that does not continue after retirement age) will
not be considered a retirement-type subsidy. The committee expects
that Treasury regulations will prevent the recharacterization of
retirement-type
benefits as benefits that are not protected by the
• • 294
provision.

Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether a subsidy does
continue after retirement. In Bellas v. CBS, Inc. and Westinghouse
295
Pension Plan,
the Westinghouse plan provided an actuarial subsidy
that eliminated the normal actuarial reduction for benefit
commencement before normal retirement age, in the case of
participants whose employment was involuntarily terminated. The
plan was amended to eliminate the subsidy, and the IRS issued a
favorable determination letter on the amendment. The plaintiff was
subsequently terminated and, 5 years after the amendment was
adopted, the District Court held that the amendment violated section
204(g) of ERISA.
The court rejected the employer's argument that the subsidy
terminated at normal retirement age, so was not a retirement-type
subsidy and thus was not a protected benefit. The employer argued
that the issue was whether the subsidy - not the stream of benefit
(2000). Special rules apply for service before the effective date of ERISA. 26
U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(D) (2000), 26 U.S.C. § 204(b)(1)(D) (2000), and to fully
insured plans. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(F) (2000), 26 U.S.C. § 204(b)(1)(F) (2000).
The plan may provide that no accruals become effective until the participant
has two continuous years of service. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(E) (2000), 26 U.S.C.
§ 204(b)(1)(E) (2000).
293. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 204(g) (2000).
294. S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 30. (Emphasis added).
295. 73 F. Supp. 2d 500 (W.D. Pa., 1999), affd, 221 F.3d 517 (3d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 843 (2001).

20021

Pension Simplification

payments - continued after normal retirement age. 96 The court held
that the benefit was a retirement-type subsidy because the plan
expressly provided that "the amount calculated in accordance with
Subsection 20.B.2(a) shall be payable for the lifetime of the
Employee," not only until age 65. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.297
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held that an actuarial subsidy
incorporated in a shutdown benefit is not a retirement-type subsidy.298
The court also held that the subsidy was not an accrued benefit, an
optional form of benefit or an early retirement benefit. 299 The Service

should clarify, preferably by regulation, when a subsidy continues
after retirement age.
Third, with respect to plant shutdown benefits and other
contingent benefits, the IRS has ruled' °° that shutdown benefits that
are "retirement-type benefits" are protected benefits, once the
triggering event has occurred, and may not be reduced or eliminated:
"Shutdown benefits that are retirement-type benefits, and not
ancillary benefits, become accrued benefits and therefore are
protected benefits under 411(d)(6) upon the occurrence of the event
that triggers the right to payment of benefits. Shutdown benefits
which are treated as supplemental or layoff benefits do not have such
protection." °'
296. Other types of subsidies clearly do continue after normal retirement
age, such as (1) an increase in the pension formula (e.g., from 1% of final
average salary (FAS) to 1.5% of FAS for each year of credited service), or (2)
the grant of additional years of credited service in calculating the amount of
the pension.
297. 221 F.3d 517 (3rd Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 843 (2001). The
Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Richardson v. Pension Plan of
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 67 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1995). This opinion was,
however, subsequently withdrawn [1996 US App. LEXIS 19036].
On
rehearing, the court avoided the issue of whether there was a retirement-type
subsidy, by holding that there was no amendment, only an interpretation of
the plan (112 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1997)). See Richardson Redux: The 9th
Circuit Avoids Determining When a Plant Shutdown Benefit is a Protected
Benefit Under Section 411(d)(6), 6 No. 3 ERISA Litig. Rep. 25 (1997). See
generally Arndt v. Security Bank SSB Employees' Pension Plan, 182 F.3d 538
(7th Cir. 1999); Ashenaugh v. Crucible, Inc. 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan,
884 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989); Ross v.
Pension Plan for Hourly Employees of SKF Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 329 (6th
Cir. 1988).
298. Ross, 846 F.2d at 329.
299. Ethan Lipsig, The 9th Circuit Weighs In on the Immutability of Plant
Shutdown Benefits and, For Good Measure, Seemingly Broadens Fiduciary
Breach Remedies for Individual Plaintiffs, 4 No. 5 ERISA Litig. Rep. 21
(1995).
300. G.C.M. 39869, April 6, 1992.
301. See generally Ross v. Pension Plan for Hourly Employees of SKF
Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding shutdown benefits not
protected); Harms v. Cavenham Forest Indus., Inc., 984 F. 2d 686 (5th Cir.
1993) and Wallace v. Cavenham Forest Indus., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 455 (D. Ore.
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In Bellas3 02 a plan -amendment eliminated a Permanent Job
Separation (PJS) benefit. The plaintiff claimed that it was both an
early retirement benefit and a retirement-type subsidy.
The
defendant argued that (1) given the wholly contingent nature of the
benefit, it was not an early retirement benefit, and (2) because it was
a contingent benefit and, because the subsidy ceased at normal
retirement age, it was not a retirement-type subsidy. In deciding for
the plaintiff, the court rejected the IRS position that a contingent
benefit is not protected until the contingent event occurs. 3
Regulations should be issued to clarify when contingent benefits
become protected by section 411(d)(6). On June 26, 2002, the IRS and
the Treasury Department requested comments containing suggestions
for future proposed regulations concerning the elimination of optional
forms of benefit from defined benefit plans, including
the types of situations in which the retention of particular optional
forms of benefit under a defined benefit plan results in significant
burdens and complexities for sponsors of retirement plans and for
participants and the conditions under which these optional forms of
benefit are of de minimis value to participants. °4
V. DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS

Benefits under qualified plans, and other retirement plans
subject to ERISA, may be divided without current taxation, in
connection with a divorce or other matrimonial proceeding, by
obtaining, from the court or agency that has jurisdiction under state
domestic relations law, a "qualified domestic relations order" or
QDRO. 305
Unfortunately, despite the importance of these rules, they are
1989) (both holding that shutdown benefits were protected); Davis v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting a violation of
411(d)(6) where amendment provided for benefits to be payable on termination
of employment with purchaser rather than termination of employment with
seller); Blank v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 926 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that contingent rule of 65 benefits not protected); Richardson v
Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 67 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that plant shutdown benefit was a protected retirement-type subsidy);
withdrawn and reh'g granted 112 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
actions at issue were not a plan amendment); Richardson Redux, The 9th
Circuit Avoids Determining When a Plant Shutdown Benefit is a Protected
Benefit Under Section 411(d)(6), 6 No. 3 ERISA Litig. Rep. 25 (August, 1997);
The 9th Circuit Weighs In On The Immutability of Plant Shutdown Benefits
And, For Good Measure, Seemingly Broadens Fiduciary Breach Remedies for
Individual Plaintiffs, 4 No. 5 ERISA Litig. Rep., 21 (December, 1995).
302. 73 F. Supp.2d 500 (W.D. Pa., 1999), affd, 221 F.3d 517 (3d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 843 (2001).
303. Id. at 508-09. The court did not address whether the PJS was an early
retirement benefit.
304. I.R.S. Notice 2000-46, 2000-28 I.R.B. 1.
305. 26 U.S.C. § 414(p) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3) (2000).
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not well understood, either by plan administrators or matrimonial
attorneys, and the poor drafting of the QDRO rules, in particular, has
given rise to a large volume of litigation. There should be a thorough
review of these rules, with a view to making them simpler to apply in
practice.3 °
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
Each year, there are numerous proposals to simplify or reform
the federal pension laws, emanating from legislators, interest groups,
practitioners, economists and others. This section will briefly discuss
some of the more interesting recent proposals.
Experience since the enactment of ERISA in 1974 suggests that
it will be difficult to extend private pension plans to the remaining
uncovered employees. Many work for small companies without a plan,
and despite years of effort to ease the burdens on small companies,
the gains have been small. This has led some commentators to
conclude that future reforms should be based on individual savings
rather than employer-sponsored plans. Thus, for instance, economist
Robert Eisner proposed a voluntary, supplemental Social Security
program offering three simple investment choices: 1) an equity index
fund; 2) a bond index fund; and, 3) Treasury securities. Every worker
covered by Social Security could make additional deductible
contributions, which would be credited to his or her account. The
annual limits would be the same as for 401(k) plans. °7 Paul Weinstein
has suggested a "universal pension" that would replace all of the
current
types
of IRAs,
including both employer-sponsored
arrangements and individual arrangements. 308 The key features of
the universal pension would be universal access, greater choice
(because it would be controlled by the individual, not the employer),
simplification, and portability. 39 According to Weinstein,
[allmost 40 percent of middle-income individuals aged 62 to 74 have
pension income, while only 15 percent of lower-income retirees of the
same age had pension income. Another study... finds that only 14
percent of families earning between $10,000 to $20,000 participated in a
401(k) plan, compared with 51 percent of those earning $75,000 or
306. Despite the many areas of concern that have become evident since
QDROs were introduced by REA in 1984, no regulations have even been
proposed. The DOL issued an excellent booklet, "QDROs: The Division of
Pensions Through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders," and sample QDRO
language was provided in IRS Notice 97-11, 1997-1 CB 379. However, neither
of these has the authority of a regulation.
307. See www.tcf.org; see generally ROBERT EISNER, SOCIAL SECURITY:
MORE, NOT LESS (Twentieth Century Fund 1998).
308. Paul Weinstein Jr., Universal Pensions: A Common-Sense Approach to
Retirement Security in the New Economy, Progressive Policy Institute Policy
Report (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.aarp.org/beyond50/2001
home.html#download (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
309. Id. at 1.
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more.... The combination of Social Security, asset income, and
pensions works well only among the top 20 percent of the aged. The
bottom 20 percent rely on Social Security for over 80 percent of their
income .... [t]he very complexity of the current system provides a
disincentive to those who want to participate. 0
Features of the proposal include the following:
*

The current 50% savers' credit, enacted by EGTRRA,
would be made refundable, so that low-income families
can benefit from it. At age 25, individuals would be
encouraged to begin saving by an initial $5000 deposit
funded by the federal government."'

*

The annual limit on deductible contributions would be
the same as for IRAs ($3,000 for 2002), and an individual
who is not eligible for a 401(k) plan could contribute an
additional $10,000. Individuals with income above
$110,000, and couples with income above $160,000,
would be limited to a $1,000 contribution.3" A small
business could choose to match employee contributions
rather than setting up its own plan. 3

"

Unlike an employer-sponsored plan benefit, the
universal pension goes with the worker from job to job,
and all vested 401(k) accounts would automatically roll
over into the universal pension when the worker changes
jobs.1

A 401(k) plan participant could choose to deposit a percentage of
all existing and future contributions into the universal pension once
vested.3 1 5 House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt has introduced a
bill to enact universal pensions. 16 Pamela Perun and Eugene Steuerle
suggested a similar approach:
Under this proposal, IRAs achieve parity with employer plans through a
coordinated individual savings limit. All workers, except perhaps the
highest income workers, without an employer plan would be permitted
the same level of deductible contributions as workers covered by a
310. Id. at 7 (citing AARP: Beyond 50: A Report to the Nation on Economic
Security (2001)); Eric Engen and William Gale, The Effects of 401(k) Plans on
Household Wealth: Differences Across Earnings Groups, Brookings Institution
(2000), at www.brook.edu/dybdocroottviews/papers/gale/20000801.pdf (last
visited Sept. 6, 2001).
311. Id. at 9. In his January 1999 State of the Union address, President
Clinton proposed government subsidized retirement savings accounts, called
USA accounts.
312. Id. at 8-9.
313. Id. at 10.
314. Id.
315 Id. at 10-11.
316. The bill is H.R. 4482, The Universal and Portable Pension Act of 2002.
See Martin A. Sullivan, With Little Fanfare, Gephardt Introduces Sweeping
Pension Reform, TAX NOTES, June 17, 2002, at 1709.
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standard plan. Thus, we retain a simplified "discrimination" rule but
one based on employee, not employer contributions. Contributions made
to the standard plan would reduce the deductible limit under the IRA
and vice versa. Canada, for example, has had a similar arrangement for
many years with its IRA-equivalent "Registered Retirement Savings
Program (RRSP)." Canadian tax law establishes an individual taxdeferred savings limit similar to the IRS section 415(c) limit. This limit
is coordinated between contributions to an RRSP and any employer
plan. Using this model in the U.S. would enable millions of Americans
without an employer plan to increase their savings for retirement
substantially. 317
Perun and Steuerle propose further that worthwhile incentives
to moderate-income workers for additional retirement savings might
be possible through the integration of some federal contribution into
IRAs and employee savings plans. 318
Several other proposals focus on reforms to employer-sponsored
plans rather than on individual savings. In its first (1989) report, the
New York State Bar Association, Special Committee on Pension
Simplification recommended "the immediate enactment of a statute
offering strong inducements for the voluntary adoption of a very
simplified type of plan." 3 9 The proposed Baseline-Plus-Supplemental
program would allow employers to adopt a baseline plan, either
defined benefit or defined contribution, but not both. The plan would
cover all employees who satisfy minimum age and length of service
requirements, and who work more than part-time. The plan would
provide for immediate (or very rapid) vesting; no integration with
Social Security; contributions or benefits similar to the present topheavy requirements; no participant loans; portability of benefits on
termination of employment; and, generally, no distributions before the
earlier of age 55 or normal retirement age, except for strictly defined
hardships. 320 An employer who adopted a baseline plan would also be
able to adopt a more flexible supplemental plan that could have more
restrictive eligibility criteria.32 '
In December, 2001, the National Center for Policy Analysis
issued a study that proposed a model 401(k) plan to correct flaws in
current plans.322 To address these flaws, the study proposed a new
317. PERUN & STEUERLE, supra note 5.
318. Id. For example, matching grants that enable savings within plans
might be met using federal dollars, provided that such plans satisfy some
minimum standard of portable benefits. Id.
319. New York State Bar Association, A Process Awry: Federal Pension
Laws, 43 TAX NOTES 463, 473 (1989).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. The National Center For Policy Analysis, Reinventing Retirement
Income In America (Dec. 2001), available at www.ncpa.org/pub/stIst248 (last
visited Sept. 6, 2002). The study cited the following major flaws: participants'
lack of knowledge of investment principles; high and hidden administrative
costs and management fees; participants cashing out their accounts when they
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type of plan, the American Freedom 401(k) plan. An employer
adopting the plan would have the benefit of safe harbors protecting it
against lawsuits alleging a breach of fiduciary duty.3 23 The major
features of the proposed plan include the following:
*

Participants would have the opportunity to invest in
efficient portfolios, such as index funds, or in portfolios
managed by investment professionals;

"

All employees would be automatically enrolled, and
would contribute between 4% and 6% of pay, unless they
affirmatively choose otherwise;

*

The plan sponsor would be required to pay all plan fees
and expenses, and to disclose them fully;

*

Cashouts following termination of employment would be
prohibited, whether initiated by the plan administrator
or by the employee. All funds could be rolled over into
another qualified plan, or remain in the plan if the new
employer does not sponsor a plan;

*

All benefits would be fully and immediately vested; and

*

Loans
and
hardship
distributions
from the
participant's account would be prohibited, but loans
from the trust would be allowed. 24

Daniel Halperin and Alicia Munnell proposed a two part
approach that should generate a more satisfactory and efficient
pattern of retirement income:
First, it provides for low-income workers directly through a program,
like the Clinton Administration's Universal Savings Accounts proposal,
which has a government-financed payment plus matching credits for
individual contributions. Since employers are relieved of providing for
their low-paid workers, some of the favorable tax treatment is removed
through the imposition of a 5 percent tax on the investment earnings of
pension funds. The second part is aimed at increasing coverage for the
rank and file through enhanced incentives-namely, increasing
contribution and benefit limits for employers who cover all workers in
their organization.325
Finally Douglas Ell has proposed what he calls the "Perfect
Plan," that would include all employees (including part-time) being
eligible to participate (an employer could impose a two-year waiting
change jobs, rather than rolling them over; and hardship distributions and
consumer loans.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See HALPERIN & MUNNELL, supra note 37. For a description of the
authors' explanation of the underlying policy rationale, see Section II.B.3,
supra.
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period); full vesting at all times; mandatory employer contributions;
employee salary reduction contributions; voluntary employer
matching contributions; and portability. No distributions would be
permitted before age 60, regardless of whether the employee is
working, unless the employee is disabled.
Except as indicated above, a Perfect Plan would not be subject to
coverage
rules,
nondiscrimination
rules, minimum required
distributions during the participant's lifetime, the top heavy rules,
benefit accrual rules, joint and survivor annuity rules (Code Section
417), or anti-cutback rules (other than protection of the account
balance).326
These proposals include many promising ideas. In addition, two
provisions enacted by EGTRRA must be expanded if they are to fulfill
their intended purposes. First, EGTRRA established an elective, nonrefundable income tax credit for pension plan startup costs of small
employers. 27
The amount of the credit is equal to 50% of the
"qualified startup costs." The credit is limited to $500 for the first
credit year and for each of the next two years, and is part of the
general business credit. This is potentially an excellent incentive, but
the amount of the credit is insufficient. The start-up costs that
qualify would otherwise be deducted by the employer. There is a
technical argument that these costs should be capitalized, but this
type of technical argument tends to have little appeal for small
employers and their tax advisors. Assuming a 35% corporate income
tax rate, the maximum annual tax saving from electing the credit is
only $325."" In addition to increasing the amount of the permissible
credit, and perhaps extending it to at least part of the employer's
contributions, it would be possible to allow a larger credit for adopting
a defined benefit plan than a defined contribution plan.
Second, EGTRRA enacted a savers' credit, a new, non-refundable
income tax credit for elective deferrals and/or IRA contributions.2
The amount of the credit is equal to the "applicable percentage" of the
"qualified retirement savings contributions" up to $2,000 per year.
The applicable percentage is derived from the following table:
326. Id.
327. 26 U.S.C. § 45E (2000).
328. According to The 2002 Small Employer Retirement Survey:
2 in 10 non-sponsors indicate that the recent tax credit for the start-up
costs of new retirement plans makes offering a retirement plan much
more attractive for their business (19 percent). An additional 49 percent
say that this tax credit makes offering retirement plans somewhat. more
attractive. However, 3 in 10 non-sponsors say that the EGTRRA tax
credit does not make offering a retirement plan any more attractive for
their business (31 percent).
Employee Benefit Research Institute, The 2002 Small Employer Retirement
Survey: 2002 SERS Summary of Findings (May 7, 2002), available at
www.ebri.org/sers/2002/O2sersof.pdf(last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
329. 26 U.S.C. § 25B (2000).
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HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD... OTHER
AGI

AGI

50%

$30,000 or less

$22,500 or less

20%

$30,001 to $32,500

$22,501 to $24,375

$15,001 to $16,250

10%

$32,501 to $50,000

$24,376 to $37,500

$16,251 to $25,000

0%

Over $50,000

Over $37,500

$15,000 or less

Over $25,000

In order to be effective, the AGI thresholds should be increased,
and the credit should be made refundable.
V. CONCLUSION
The private pension system in the United States, as in all other
industrial nations, will face unprecedented challenges during the next
30 years as a result of the aging population and the resulting financial
pressures on Social Security and Medicare. In the shorter term, the
system has been hurt by the weak economy and the stock market
turmoil resulting from Enron, Worldcom and other recent corporate
scandals.
Pension simplification will not solve these societal
problems, but their impact will be ameliorated if pension coverage can
be extended, particularly to more low-income individuals and more
employees of small businesses. Simplification is, in my view, an
essential part of an ongoing campaign to encourage these individuals
and businesses to join the system.

